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ABSTRACT
This article proposes principles for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion when prosecuting securities crime under state law. Securities
transactions in the United States are subject to a dual-regulatory, multi-
enforcer regime. Securities are dually regulated by the federal government
and the states, with each regulatory scheme including both civil and
criminal enforcement provisions. Those laws are multi-enforced at each
level by a regulator, private parties, and prosecutors. And yet, the role of
state prosecution of securities crime within this regime is undertheorized,
and there is little guidance for state prosecutors about how their
prosecutorial decisions affect this regime. This article, drawing from the
goals of prosecuting securities crime and the implications of this complex
regime, provides guidance on states’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion
therein.
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................... 31
II. STATE PROSECUTION OF SECURITIESCRIMEWITHINADUAL-
REGULATORY, MULTI-ENFORCERREGIME...................................... 34
A. Dual Federal-State Regulation .................................................. 34
B. Scope of State Securities Crimes .............................................. 36
1. Definition of “Security” ...................................................... 37
2. Mental State About Unregistered, Non-Exempt Status....... 40
3. Mental State About False or Misleading Nature of
Statement ............................................................................. 41
4. Scope of the Duty to Disclose ............................................. 42
*
Wendy Gerwick Couture is the James E. Wilson Distinguished Professor of Law at the
University of Idaho College of Law, where she teaches securities regulation, white collar
crime, and business associations.
2019] PRINCIPLES FOR STATE PROSECUTION OF SECURITIESCRIME 31
C. Multiple Enforcers .................................................................... 44
D. Potential for Multiple States to Have Criminal Jurisdiction ..... 45
E. Potential for Multiple Prosecutions........................................... 46
III. THEGOALS OF PROSECUTING SECURITIESCRIMES .............................. 49
A. Purposes of the Securities Laws and Enforcement Thereof...... 49
B. Theories of Criminal Punishment ............................................. 50
C. Goals of Prosecuting Securities Crime ..................................... 54
IV. PRINCIPLES FOR STATE PROSECUTION OF SECURITIESCRIME ............. 56
A. The Importance of States’ Prosecutorial Discretion When
Prosecuting Securities Crimes .................................................. 56
B. Proposed Principles for State Prosecution of Securities
Crime......................................................................................... 62
V. CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 80
I. INTRODUCTION
Securities transactions in the United States are subject to a dual-
regulatory, multi-enforcer regime. Securities are dually regulated by the
federal government and the states, with each regulatory scheme including
both civil and criminal enforcement provisions. Those laws are multi-
enforced at each level by a regulator, private parties, and prosecutors. In
this article, I focus on the role of state prosecutors within this complex
regime.
States are quite active in prosecuting securities crime. According to
the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”),
from 2013 through 2017, states prosecuted an average of 258 securities-
related criminal actions per year.
1
During this same time period, federal
prosecutors filed an average of 5,306.4 “white collar crime” criminal cases
in federal district court.
2
Within the broad category of “white collar
1. See N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N, 2018 N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N ENFORCEMENT
REP. BASED ON 2017 DATA 11 (2018) (“U.S. NASAA Member Enforcement Activity 2013-
2017”) (compiling statistics based on data self-reported by NASAA’s members), http://ww
w.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018-Enforcement-Report-Based-on-2017-Data-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX28-S2SX]. States prosecuted 255 criminal actions in 2017,
241 criminal actions in 2016, 261 criminal actions in 2015, 271 criminal actions in 2014,
and 262 criminal actions in 2013.
2. See 2017 U.S. ATT’YS’ ANN. STAT. REP. 12 (“Criminal Cases and Defendants in
United States District Court”) (reporting 4,379 total White Collar Crime cases filed),
https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1081801/download [https://perma.cc/Y88M-Y8SH];
2016 U.S. ATT’YS’ ANN. STAT. REP. 12 (“Criminal Cases and Defendants in United States
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crime,” which includes various non-securities crimes like “bankruptcy
fraud” and “federal program fraud,” an average of sixty-four per year were
subcategorized as “corporate fraud,”
3
an average of approximately 130 per
year as “securities fraud,”
4
and an average of eighty-three per year as “other
investment fraud.”
5
It is likely that other federal securities prosecutions
during this time period fell within other subcategories of “white collar
crime,” such as “insurance fraud” and “mortgage fraud,” and within other
broad categories, such as “government regulatory offenses.” These
statistics demonstrate that, although the Department of Justice is the
dominant player in the prosecution of securities crime, state prosecutors
play a significant role.
And yet, the role of state prosecution of securities crime within this
dual-regulatory, multi-enforcer regime is undertheorized, and there is little
guidance for state prosecutors about how their prosecutorial decisions
affect this regime. In this article, I seek to identify the goals of state
prosecution of securities crime and, drawing therefrom, to provide
guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion within this regime.
In Part II, I contextualize state prosecution of securities crime within
District Court”) (reporting 4,791 total White Collar Crime cases filed), https://www.justice.
gov/usao/page/file/988896/download [https://perma.cc/NBW7-R5NQ]; 2015 U.S. ATT’YS’
ANN. STAT. REP. 12 (“Criminal Cases and Defendants in United States District Court”)
(reporting 5,233 total White Collar Crime cases filed), at https://www.justice.gov/usao/file/8
31856/download [https://perma.cc/U87K-YJZQ]; 2014 U.S. ATT’YS’ ANN. STAT. REP. 12
(“Criminal Cases and Defendants in United States District Court”) (reporting 5,829 total
White Collar Crime cases filed), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/pages/attac
hments/2015/03/23/14statrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YH7-9A M9]; 2013 U.S. ATT’YS’ ANN.
STAT. REP. 58 (“Criminal Cases and Defendants in United States District Court”) (reporting
6,300 total White Collar Crime cases filed), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/l
egacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf [https://per ma.cc/3UAC-BU76].
3. 2013-2017 U.S. ATT’YS’ ANN. STAT. REP., supra note 2, at Table 3A. In fiscal year
2017, 62 criminal cases filed were classified as “corporate fraud.” In fiscal year 2016, 54
criminal cases filed were so classified. In fiscal year 2015, 69 criminal cases filed were so
classified. In fiscal year 2014, 70 criminal cases filed were so classified. In fiscal year 2013,
66 criminal cases filed were so classified.
4. 2013-2017 U.S. ATT’YS’ ANN. STAT. REP., supra note 2, at Table 3A. In fiscal year
2017, 93 criminal cases filed were classified as “securities fraud.” In fiscal year 2016, 118
criminal cases filed were so classified. In fiscal year 2015, 152 criminal cases filed were so
classified. In fiscal year 2014, 132 criminal cases filed were so classified. In fiscal year
2013, 154 criminal cases filed were so classified.
5. 2013-2017 U.S. ATT’YS’ ANN. STAT. REP., supra note 2, at Table 3A. In fiscal year
2017, 87 criminal cases filed were classified as “other investment fraud.” In fiscal year
2016, 97 criminal cases filed were so classified. In fiscal year 2015, 101 criminal cases filed
were so classified. In fiscal year 2014, 131 criminal cases filed were so classified. In fiscal
year 2013, 119 criminal cases filed were so classified.
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this dual-regulatory, multi-enforcer regime. First, because of dual state-
federal regulation, every securities transaction is subject to at least two
regulatory schemes: federal law and one state’s law. Interstate transactions
are subject to multiple states’ laws, and nationally traded firms are
potentially subject to regulation in every state. Second, although federal
and state law are largely coextensive, states sometimes criminalize
securities-related conduct that is not a federal crime. Third, multiple states,
in addition to the federal government, may have criminal jurisdiction to
prosecute actors for the same securities-related conduct. Finally, under the
dual sovereignty doctrine, successive prosecutions for the same conduct are
possible—state and then federal, federal and then state, or one state and
then another state.
Next, in Part III, I seek to define the goals of prosecuting securities
crime. Drawing from the purposes of the securities laws and enforcement
thereof and the theories of criminal punishment, I contend that these goals
are multi-faceted and sometimes in tension. On the one hand, securities
crime prosecution should promote the following aims: (1) specifically and
generally deterring violations of the securities laws; (2) punishing securities
law violators, both to further deterrence and to express society’s
condemnation; and (3) compensating investors who have been harmed by
securities violations. On the other hand, securities crime prosecution
should aim to further these purposes (1) without incurring unnecessary
prosecution or punishment costs and (2) without unduly inhibiting capital
formation. Moreover, I argue that, when states are seeking to further these
goals by prosecuting securities crime, they should be cognizant that, rather
than acting in isolation, they are acting within a dual-regulatory, multi-
enforcer regime. Ideally, state securities prosecutions, alongside other
federal and state enforcement by public and private parties, would be
calibrated so as to balance these sometimes-competing goals.
Against this backdrop, in Part IV, I argue that the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is the appropriate means of calibrating state
prosecution of securities crime within this dual-regulatory, multi-enforcer
regime. Through the exercise of their discretion, state prosecutors can
respond quickly to new data about the benefits and harms of prosecution, as
well as to adjustments in other enforcement levers within the regime.
Finally, I propose a three-step analysis to guide state prosecutors when
exercising their prosecutorial discretion with respect to securities crime.
Step One incorporates the multi-faceted goals of prosecuting securities
crime, Step Two layers on the multi-enforcer component of that regime,
and Step Three incorporates the dual-regulatory aspect of that regime.
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II. STATE PROSECUTION OF SECURITIESCRIMEWITHINADUAL-
REGULATORY, MULTI-ENFORCERREGIME
State criminal prosecution is but one enforcement lever within a dual-
regulatory, multiple-enforcer regime. Securities are dually regulated at the
federal and state levels; and although federal and state securities crimes are
largely coextensive, states sometimes criminalize conduct that is not a
federal crime. At each level, there are multiple enforcers—public and
private, civil and criminal. Moreover, multiple states, in addition to the
federal government, may have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute securities-
related conduct; and, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, successive
prosecutions for the same conduct can be pursued by different sovereigns.
A. Dual Federal-State Regulation
Securities are dually regulated by the federal government and the
states. The federal government broadly regulates securities transactions
within the United States. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 regulates
the offer or sale of securities via “any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails,”
6
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits manipulative or
deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
“by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange.”
7
When
enacting the federal securities laws, Congress included express savings
clauses,
8
thus recognizing that each state likewise regulates securities
transactions within that state.
9
For example, the Uniform Securities Act,
versions of which have been enacted by at least 40 states,
10
regulates the
offer or sale of securities
11
and prohibits securities fraud
12
if “the offer to
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a)-(c).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a).
9. See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and
Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 112 (2005) (“The dual regulatory structure
created by Congress was deliberate, and recognized that the states’ experience and expertise
in the field would be necessary to provide remedies beyond those that the new statutes
created.”).
10. See Carlos Berdejó, Small Investments, Big Losses: The States’ Role in Protecting
Local Investors from Securities Fraud, 92 WASH. L. REV. 567, 586 n.107 (2017) (“At least
forty states have adopted some version of the Uniform Securities Act.”).
11. SeeUNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (NAT’L. CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS. ONUNIF. STATE LAWS
2002); see also UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 301 (1956) (amended 1997) (“It is unlawful for any
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sell or the sale is made in this State or the offer to purchase or the purchase
is made and accepted in this State.”
13
As a consequence, every securities
transaction within the United States is subject to, at a minimum, two
regulatory schemes, while nationally traded securities are potentially
subject to fifty-one regulatory schemes.
14
On certain issues, however, federal law preempts or precludes state
law. For example, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996 preempts state registration or qualification requirements with respect
to “covered securities,”
15
including securities that are exempt from federal
registration requirements under Rule 506 of Regulation D.
16
As another
example, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
precludes most securities class actions asserting misrepresentation claims
under “the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof.”
17
On other issues, federal law largely defers to state law. For example,
in the contexts of limited offerings not exceeding $5,000,000
18
and
intrastate securities offerings,
19
federal exemptions from registration
person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is registered under this act.”).
12. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501 (2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (1956) (“It is unlawful
for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”).
13. UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 610(a) & (b) (2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 414(a) & (b)
(1956) (amended 1997) (stating that specified sections of the act “apply to persons who sell
or offer to sell when (1) an offer to sell is made in this state, or (2) an offer to buy is
made and accepted in this state.”).
14. See Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual
Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1383 (2013)
[hereinafter Rose, State] (“State jurisdiction over securities fraud is not limited to states
where the offending firm is headquartered or incorporated. Instead, it typically extends to all
states where an offer or sale of the firm’s securities has been made. Thus, each of the fifty
states could likely assert jurisdiction over a nationally traded firm based on the same alleged
misstatement or omission, because at least one resident is likely to have purchased the
firm’s shares while the misstatement or omission was allegedly distorting the price. A public
firm cannot effectively limit the investors who purchase its shares in the secondary market
based on state residency, so it has no choice but to expose itself to this level of jurisdictional
overlap.”).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1)(A).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(F); 17 C.R.F. § 230.506.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).
18. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(i) (providing that the prohibition on general
solicitation and advertising and the limitations on resale do not apply to offers and sales that
are made “[e]xclusively in one or more states that provide for the registration of the
securities, and require the public filing and delivery to investors of a substantive disclosure
document before sale, and are made in accordance with those state provisions.”).
19. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147 & 230.147A (“This section shall not raise any
presumption that the exemption provided by section 3(a)(11) of the Act (15U.S.C.
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impose few requirements, largely deferring to state offering regulation.
Indeed, the SEC declined to impose an offering size limit on Rule 147 and
Rule 147A intrastate offerings because “we believe it appropriate that the
resident investor protections in intrastate offerings primarily flow from the
requirements of state securities law.”
20
With respect to securities crimes, federal law neither preempts state
law nor defers to it. Thus, the federal government and the states operate
dually, each with full prosecutorial power within the scope of its criminal
jurisdiction.
B. Scope of State Securities Crimes
State securities crimes are largely coextensive with federal securities
crimes.
21
Most prominently,
22
securities fraud and the offer or sale of
unregistered, non-exempt securities are crimes under both federal
23
and
state law.
24
State law sometimes diverges from federal law, however,
criminalizing conduct that is not illegal under federal law. For example,
77c(a)(11)) is not available for transactions by an issuer which do not satisfy all of the
provisions of this section.”).
20. Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 81 Fed. Reg.
83494, 83509 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 200, 230, 239, 240, 249, 270, and 275) (Nov. 21,
2016).
21. See Jones, supra note 9, at 128 (“Overall then, securities industry participants are
guided by uniform legal principles that prohibit them from making false statements or
misleading investors.”).
22. See Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to
Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1279, 1295 (2004) (“[T]hree distinct types of
blue-sky laws remained in effect after 1996: antifraud provisions, provisions requiring the
registration or licensing of certain persons engaged in the securities business, and provisions
requiring the registration of securities.”).
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) & (c) (2011) (prohibiting the offer or sale of unregistered,
non-exempt securities); 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2011) (providing for criminal penalties for
willfully violating any provision of the Securities Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2011)
(prohibiting securities fraud); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2011) (providing for criminal penalties
for violating any provision of the Exchange Act).
24. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (prohibiting the offer or sale
of unregistered, non-exempt securities); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002)
(prohibiting securities fraud); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 508(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002)
(providing for criminal penalties for willfully violating § 301 and § 501); see also UNIF.
SEC. ACT § 101 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1956) (prohibiting securities fraud); UNIF. SEC. ACT §
301 (amended 1997) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1956) (prohibiting the offer or sale of
unregistered, non-exempt securities); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 409 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1956)
(providing for criminal penalties for willfully violating § 101 and § 301).
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some states interpret the following elements of securities crimes more
broadly than their federal counterpart: (1) the definition of “security”; (2)
the requisite mental state about a security’s unregistered, non-exempt status
when a defendant is charged with offering or selling such a security; (3) the
requisite mental state about the false or misleading nature of a statement
when a defendant is charged with securities fraud; and (4) the scope of the
duty to disclose when a defendant is charged with securities fraud.
25
1. Definition of “Security”
In order for a transaction to be within the scope of a jurisdiction’s
securities laws, the interest at issue must qualify as a “security” under the
relevant regulatory scheme. Although federal and state securities acts
define “security” similarly,
26
state law has a potentially broader reach,
particularly with respect to the catch-all category of “investment contracts.”
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court held that, under federal
law, an investment contract is “a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby
a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. . . .”
27
Federal courts are split, however, about what is required to satisfy the
common enterprise element. Some courts require horizontal commonality
(i.e., a pooling of investors’ financial interests), while others interpret this
element more expansively as including vertical commonality (i.e., a
pooling of the promoter’s and at least one investor’s interests).
28
Moreover,
among those courts that accept vertical commonality, there is a split
between a narrow interpretation (requiring that the promoter’s and the
investor’s financial interests be intertwined) and a broad interpretation
(merely requiring that the promoter’s efforts and the investor’s financial
interests be intertwined).
29
For several reasons, state law potentially defines investment contracts
25. These examples are not comprehensive. For example, some states define the
element of “materiality” more broadly than under federal law. Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV.
669, 706 (1984).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2011); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2011); UNIF. SEC. ACT §
102(28) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(m) (amended 1997) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1956).
27. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
28. James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72
OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 61 (2011) (summarizing the case law).
29. Id.
38 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:1
more expansively than federal law. First, some states have judicially
30
or
statutorily
31
adopted variations of the so-called “risk-capital” test,
32
either in
addition to
33
or instead of
34
the federal Howey test. For example, as the
risk-capital test was articulated by the California Supreme Court, an
investment contract exists if there is
an attempt by an issuer to raise funds for a business venture or
enterprise; an indiscriminate offering to the public at large where
the persons solicited are selected at random; a passive position on
the part of the investor; and the conduct of the enterprise by the
issuer with other people’s money.
35
As another example, as the risk-capital test was articulated by the
Hawaii Supreme Court, an investment contract is created whenever the
following elements are present: (1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an
offeror, (2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror’s
promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding
that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will
accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and (4)
the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
36
30. E.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908 (Cal.
1961)(describing how to make a risk capital assessment).
31. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.005(17)(a) (West 2011) (“‘Security’ means
any . . . investment of money or other consideration in the risk capital of a venture with the
expectation of some valuable benefit to the investor where the investor does not receive the
right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the venture.”).
32. SeeMark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 1069, 1092 (1992) (“The first point to note about the risk capital test is that there is
no single risk capital test. There are different versions in different states.”).
33. E.g., People v. Black, 8 Cal. App. 5th 889, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), rev. denied
(Cal. 2017) (“It is generally accepted that both the risk capital and federal tests may be
applied, either separately or together; a transaction is a security if it satisfies either test.”);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-13(1)(s) (West 2016) (defining “investment contract” in the
alternative under the Howey test and the risk-capital test).
34. E.g., Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 94, 101 (D. Haw. 1982) (“Plaintiffs
rightly point out that the question is governed by the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in
State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). In that case, the
court held that, for purposes of the state securities laws, it would not apply the Howey test
but rather a ‘risk capital’ test. . . .”).
35. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908 (Cal. 1961) (quoting T.W.
Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Securities Act, 33 CAL. L.
REV. 343, 360 (1945)).
36. State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971) (relying on Ronald
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The risk-capital test has the potential to reach more broadly than the
Howey test. First, it either eliminates Howey’s expectation of profits
element altogether (as in California)
37
or expands it to include “valuable
benefit of some kind” (as in Hawaii).
38
In addition, the risk-capital test
replaces Howey’s common enterprise element with the more amorphous
requirement that the capital be subjected to the risks of the enterprise,
which could occur in circumstances in which a common enterprise is not
present.
39
In short, states’ adoption of the risk-capital test has the potential
to bring some interests that are not securities under federal law within the
scope of states’ securities laws.
40
Second, some states, albeit while applying the Howey test, have
interpreted the common enterprise element to include vertical commonality
(either narrow or broad), despite the federal court split. For example, the
Uniform Securities Act adopts a narrow vertical commonality test:
“‘[C]ommon enterprise’ means an enterprise in which the fortunes of the
investor are interwoven with those of either the person offering the
investment, a third party, or other investors.”
41
The Montana Supreme
Court has gone even further, adopting broad vertical commonality: “[W]e
conclude that for the purposes of the Act, a common venture can be
established by satisfying the elements of any of the above discussed
methods—either horizontal, broad vertical, or narrow vertical
commonality.”
42
Accordingly, some states apply a broader interpretation of
J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a ‘Security’: Is There a More Meaningful Formula?,
18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 412 (1967)).
37. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 909 (Cal. 1961) (stating that
an interest satisfying the risk-capital test is a security “whether or not they [the investors]
expect a return on their capital in one form or another”).
38. Sargent, supra note 32, at 1094 (“The benefits/profits distinction reflects a
departure from Howey, but its meaning is not all that elusive, and it is of importance only in
those exceptional cases in which profits in the narrow sense are not expected.”).
39. Sargent, supra note 32, at 1095.
40. See Jeffrey A. Blomberg & Henry E. Forcier, But Is It A Security? A Look at Offers
from Start-Up Companies, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2005, at 49, 52 (“It is very likely,
particularly with respect to the offer and sale of any type of club memberships, that the
application of the risk capital test will result in the treatment of such an interest as a security
more often than if simply applying the Howey Test.”); Richard S. Hardy, The New Gold
Rush: The Last Frontier of the Securities Laws?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 359, 374 (1989)
(“Subsequent use of the risk capital test by California courts demonstrates the usefulness of
the new test in reaching transactions the Howey test could not.”).
41. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(28)(D) (UNIF. LAWCOMM’N 2002).
42. Redding v. Montana First Judicial Dist. Court, 281 P.3d 189, 197 (Mont. 2012); see
also People v. First Meridian Planning Corp., 658 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (N.Y. 1995) (citations
omitted) (“[T]he common enterprise factor can be established by proof that ‘the fortunes of
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the Howey test than is applied by some federal courts.
In sum, on the margins, it is possible for an interest, albeit not a
security under federal law, to fall within the scope of a state’s securities
laws, including its criminal provisions.
2. Mental State About Unregistered, Non-Exempt Status
Offering or selling securities that are neither registered nor exempt
from registration violates both federal and state securities law,
43
and, if
done with the requisite mental state, such a violation can be criminally
prosecuted under both federal and state law.
44
Some states require a lower
mental state, however, than federal law.
Under federal law, selling unregistered, non-exempt securities is only
a crime if a person acts “willfully.”
45
A person “willfully” violates the
federal securities laws by “intentionally undertaking an act that one knows
to be wrongful.”
46
As applied to the sale of unregistered, non-exempt
securities, the Government must prove that the defendant knew that the
securities were neither registered nor exempt from registration.
47
all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy [of those seeking the investment or a third
party].’”).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) & (c) (2011); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (amended 1997) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1956)(providing that selling unregistered securities violates state and federal law).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2011); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 508(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see
also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 409 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1956) (providing that selling unregistered
securities can be criminally prosecuted under state and federal law).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
46. See United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1166 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that this
instruction was not reversible error); see also United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188
(9th Cir. 2004), amended by 413 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Under our jurisprudence, then,
‘willfully’ as it is used in § 78ff(a) means intentionally undertaking an act that one knows to
be wrongful. . . .”); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976) (citations
omitted) (defining “willfulness” as “a realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing a
wrongful act” and that the act “be ‘wrongful under the securities laws and that the
knowingly wrongful act involve a significant risk of effecting the violation that has
occurred’”).
47. See Lloyd, 807 F.3d at 1166 (finding no reversible error where the instruction
required the jury to find that “knowing the securities were not registered and not exempt, the
defendant willfully sold or caused them to be sold to the public” but did not require the jury
to find knowledge of the registration requirement); United States v. Lindo, 18 F.3d 353, 356
(6th Cir. 1994) (discussing the defendant’s argument that, if a good faith reliance on counsel
instruction had been given, “the government could not have borne its burden of proving that
he willfully caused shares, which he knew to be neither registered nor exempt from
registration, to be sold to the public”); see also WHITE COLLAR CRIME BUSINESS AND
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Many states criminalize the offer or sale of unregistered, non-exempt
securities with a lower mental state. In the majority of states, the offer or
sale of unregistered, non-exempt securities must be “willful,” but
willfulness merely requires the defendant to have offered or sold the
securities of his or her own volition.
48
These states do not require proof of
any mental state regarding the unregistered or non-exempt status of the
securities.
49
In California, it is a crime to sell an unregistered, non-exempt
security if the defendant “was criminally negligent in failing to know that
the security was not exempt.”
50
Criminal negligence “refers to a higher
degree of negligence than is required to establish negligent default on a
mere civil issue. The negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or
reckless.”
51
Thus, unlike under federal law, a defendant can potentially be
convicted under state law of selling unregistered, non-exempt securities
even if he or she did not know that the securities were unregistered and
non-exempt.
3. Mental State About False or Misleading Nature of Statement
Securities fraud is a crime under federal and state law,
52
but some
states require a lower mental state regarding the false or misleading nature
of the fraudulent statement than is required under federal law.
The federal crime of securities fraud is usually prosecuted under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.
53
Section 32(a), which criminalizes the violation of Section
10(b), requires a different mental state depending on how the alleged
misrepresentation was communicated.
54
If the alleged misrepresentation
was contained in a registration statement or mandatory SEC filing, the
REGULATORY OFFENSES § 12.02 (citing Lloyd) (“To obtain a conviction . . . for unlawful
sale of unregistered securities, the government must prove . . . ‘that knowing the securities
were not registered and not exempt, the defendant willfully sold or caused them to be sold to
the public. . . .’”); MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 485-57-3 (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. 2018).
48. See JOSEPH C. LONG, MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, 12A BLUE
SKY LAW § 10:15 (2019) (“Intent—Majority view that intent need not be shown for
nonregistration violation.”) (citing authority).
49. Id.
50. People v. Salas, 127 P.3d 40, 48 (Cal. 2006).
51. Stark v. Superior Court, 257 P.3d 41, 59 (Cal. 2011) (citing authority).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501 (2002); UNIF. SEC.
ACT § 508(a) (2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (1956); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 409 (1956).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
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Government must prove that the defendant knew that the misrepresentation
was false or misleading.
55
If the alleged misrepresentation was oral or in a
document not filed with the SEC, the Government must prove that the
defendant was at least reckless with respect to truth or falsity.
56
Of note,
some misrepresentations can also be prosecuted under Section 17(a)(2) of
the Securities Act.
57
To convict under that provision,
58
the Government
must prove that the defendant was at least reckless with respect to truth or
falsity.
59
Under state law, however, a defendant can potentially be prosecuted
for misrepresentations with a lower mental state about the false or
misleading nature of the statement. For example, under New York’s
securities statute, the Martin Act, a defendant can be criminally convicted
for making a false statement if he or she “(i) knew the truth; or (ii) with
reasonable effort could have known the truth; or (iii) made no reasonable
effort to ascertain the truth; or (iv) did not have knowledge concerning the
representation or statement made.”
60
In other words, as recognized by a
number of commentators, a defendant who is merely negligent about the
false or misleading nature of a statement can potentially be convicted of a
crime under New York law.
61
4. Scope of the Duty to Disclose
Under both federal and state law, it is a crime to materially mislead
investors by remaining silent in the face of a duty to disclose.
62
The scope
55. Id.; see Wendy Gerwick Couture, Prosecuting Securities Fraud Under Section
17(a)(2), 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 686 (2019) [hereinafter Couture, Prosecuting] (citing
authority).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a); see Couture, Prosecuting, supra note 55, at 686–87 (citing
authority).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
59. See Couture, Prosecuting, supra note 55, at 688 (citing authority).
60. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352-c(1)(c) & 359-g(2) (McKinney 1996).
61. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly of
Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 18 (2009) [hereinafter
Couture, White Collar] (“[A] defendant who negligently makes a false statement could be
held criminally liable under the Martin Act, despite the fact that the same conduct neither
implicates federal criminal liability nor affords a civil remedy.”); Johnathan Mathiesen, Dr.
Spitzlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love “Balkanization,” 2006 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 311, 316 (noting that the Martin Act “affords extraordinary leverage as a
prosecutorial weapon in part from its lack of a scienter requirement.”).
62. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239, n.17 (1988) (“Silence, absent a duty
to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b–5.”); Frank C. Razzano, The Martin Act: An
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of the duty to disclose is sometimes more expansive under state law than
under federal law, however.
Under federal law, there is not a duty to disclose all material
information.
63
Rather, there is a duty to speak only if mandated by positive
law.
64
First, if other statements are rendered misleadingly incomplete
without additional disclosure, there is a duty to disclose.
65
Additional
sources of a duty to speak include mandatory SEC disclosure rules
66
and
fiduciary duties.
67
Some states impose broader duties to disclose, however. For example,
the Texas Securities Act criminalizes securities fraud, which it defines as
including “an intentional failure to disclose a material fact.”
68
In other
words, it imposes a duty to disclose all material facts.
69
Overview, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 125, 129 (2006) (“A showing of neither intent nor scienter is
required to prove a violation of the Act and sustain civil liability or criminal culpability,
unless a felony is charged. The purpose of the Act is to allow the Attorney General to
prosecute acts and practices beyond intentional fraud.”).
63. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44 (2011) (“[I]t bears
emphasis that § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5(b) do not create an affirmative duty to disclose any
and all material information.”); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir.
1993) (“But a corporation is not required to disclose a fact merely because a reasonable
investor would very much like to know that fact. Rather, an omission is actionable under
the securities laws only when the corporation is subject to a duty to disclose the omitted
facts.”).
64. See Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[F]irms are
entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) unless positive law creates a
duty to disclose.”).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b) (imposing a duty to disclose if necessary “to make . . .
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading”).
66. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015)
(concluding that “failure to make a required Item 303 disclosure in a 10-Q filing is indeed
an omission that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim”); but see
In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a
violation of Item 303’s disclosure duty is not actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5).
67. See Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 661 (1983) (“In determining whether a tippee is
under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether the
insider’s ‘tip’ constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.”).
68. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(F) (West 2003); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 581–29(C)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
69. See Bridwell v. State, No. 05-07-00258-CR, 2008 WL 467271, at *5 (Tex. App.
Feb. 23, 2008) (“The purpose of the Texas Securities Act is to require sellers of securities to
be truthful and provide investors with all material facts, allowing them to make informed
decisions.”).
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C. Multiple Enforcers
In addition to being dually-regulated at the federal and state levels,
securities laws are multi-enforced at each level by a regulator, private
parties, and prosecutors. At the federal level, the Securities and Exchange
Commission civilly enforces the securities laws via administrative
proceedings or civil enforcement actions.
70
In addition, to the extent that
federal law provides a private right of action, either express or implied,
private litigants may also enforce federal securities laws.
71
Finally, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) criminally enforces federal securities
laws.
72
Likewise, at the state level, each state’s securities regulator civilly
enforces the state’s securities laws via administrative proceedings or civil
actions.
73
In addition, to the extent that state law provides a private right of
action, private litigants enforce the state’s securities laws.
74
Finally, state
prosecutors, either state-level or local,
75
criminally enforce the state’s
securities laws.
76
Thus, assuming that a securities transaction is within the scope of only
one state’s securities laws, there are potentially five enforcers with respect
to that securities transaction: the SEC, the state securities regulator, private
parties asserting claims under federal and/or state law, the DOJ, and the
state’s prosecutors. If a securities transaction is within the scope of
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t & 77u (2017); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78u-1, 78u-2 & 78u-3 (2017).
71. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (“Civil liabilities on account of false registration statement”);
15 U.S.C. § 771 (2017) (“Civil liabilities arising in connection with prospectuses and
communications”); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(2017) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . To
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.”); Superintendent of Ins. of State of N. Y.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is now established that a private
right of action is implied under § 10(b).”).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2017); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2017).
73. UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 603 & 604 (UNIF. LAWCOMM’N 2002).
74. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410
(1956, as amended in 1986) (“Civil liabilities.”).
75. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from
the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 548 (2011) (“In addition, state-level prosecutors typically
handle business and white collar crimes, including antitrust and sometimes securities
violations, either exclusively or concurrently with local prosecutors.”).
76. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 508(a) (2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 409 (1956) (“Any
person who willfully violates any provision of this act . . . shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”)
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multiple states’ securities laws, the number of potential enforcers increases
accordingly.
D. Potential for Multiple States to Have Criminal Jurisdiction
In general, states exercise territorial jurisdiction to prosecute crimes.
77
This includes not only conduct within the state’s territory, but also out-of-
state conduct with in-state territorial effects.
78
Many state securities laws include specific jurisdictional provisions,
which likewise extend the state’s criminal jurisdiction to out-of-state
conduct directed to the state. For example, the Uniform Securities Act’s
jurisdictional provision “applies to all types of proceedings specified by the
Act–administrative, civil, and criminal.”
79
Pursuant thereto, the Act’s
prohibition on the offer or sale of unregistered, non-exempt securities and
the Act’s prohibition on securities fraud apply to any person who offers to
sell, sells, offers to purchase, or purchases securities within the state.
80
The
Act defines in-state offers as (1) offers originating from within the state or
(2) offers directed to and received at a place in the state.
81
Thus, “a person
may violate the law of a particular state without ever being within the
state.”
82
As a consequence, in an interstate securities transaction, it is possible
for multiple states to have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute the parties
77. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(Describing the conditions that would be sufficient to punish an individual in a given state
for their or another’s conduct, the Model Penal Code suggests that a state’s jurisdictional
reach is broad and reaching, even outside their geographically defined territory).
78. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962) (“[A] person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed by
his own conduct or the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable if either the
conduct that is an element of the offense or the result that is such an element occurs within
this State.”).
79. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 610 cmt. 1 (2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 414 cmt. 1
(1956, as amended in 1997) (“Section 414 and its appendages . . . determine the scope of the
Act for all kinds of proceedings—civil, criminal, injunctive, and administrative.”).
80. See UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 610(a)-(b) (2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 414(a)-(b)
(1956, as amended in 1997)(“Scope of the act and service of process.”).
81. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 610(c) (2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 414(c) (1956, as
amended in 1997) (“For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is made in this
state, whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offer (1) originates
from this state or (2) is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the place to which
it is directed (or at any post office in this state in the case of a mailed offer).”).
82. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 610 cmt. 1 (2002); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 414 cmt. 1
(1956, as amended in 1997) (“Interstate transactions.”).
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involved. For example, if an unregistered, non-exempt or fraudulent offer
originates from State A and is directed to State B, both State A and State B
potentially have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute the offeror.
83
At the
extreme, “each of the fifty states could likely assert jurisdiction over a
nationally traded firm based on the same alleged misstatement or omission,
because at least one resident is likely to have purchased the firm’s shares
while the misstatement or omission was allegedly distorting the price.”
84
E. Potential for Multiple Prosecutions
Not only are the parties to a securities transaction subject to the
criminal jurisdiction of the federal government and of at least one state,
they can potentially be subject to multiple prosecutions for the same
conduct. These prosecutions could proceed in any order—state and then
federal, federal and then state, or one state and then another state.
Under the dual-sovereignty doctrine, a defendant can be subject to
successive prosecutions by different sovereigns for the same conduct
without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple prosecutions for “the same
offence.”
85
But, as the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Gamble v.
United States, crimes under different sovereigns’ laws are not “the same
offence.”
We have long held that a crime under one sovereign’s laws is not
“the same offence” as a crime under the laws of another
sovereign. Under this “dual-sovereignty” doctrine, a State may
prosecute a defendant under state law even if the Federal
Government has prosecuted him for the same conduct under a
federal statute. Or the reverse may happen, as it did here.
86
This doctrine “honors the substantive differences between the interests
that two sovereigns can have in punishing the same act.”
87
83. See Lintz v. Carey Manor Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 543, 550 (W.D. Va. 1985) (“[S]o long
as there is some territorial nexus to a particular transaction, the laws of two or more states
may simultaneously apply.”) (citing Louis Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky
Laws, 71 HARV. L. REV. 209, 242 (1957)).
84. Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1383.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V
86. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019); see also United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (“It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both
national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may
be punished by each.”).
87. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1966.
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The dual-sovereignty doctrine applies, not only to successive federal-
state and state-federal prosecutions, but also to successive prosecutions by
different states.
88
Indeed, in an amicus curiae brief arguing for a broad
interpretation of the Uniform Securities Act’s jurisdiction provision, the
North American Securities Administrators Association recognized that
multiple states could engage in successive prosecutions of securities
crimes: “Under criminal statutes such as the KUSA [Kansas Uniform
Securities Act], if an illegal act transpires over several states, each state can
assert jurisdiction over the entire scope of the criminal conduct. This does
not violate the principle of double jeopardy because each state is a separate
sovereign.”
89
Critics of the dual sovereignty doctrine argue that it undercuts the
basic premise of the Double Jeopardy Clause that a “free society does not
allow its government to try the same individual for the same crime until it’s
happy with the result.”
90
They contend that federalism, which was meant to
limit the power of government, should not be used to expand the
government’s power.
91
Finally, they note that the “expansion of federal
criminal law has exacerbated the problems created by the separate-
sovereigns doctrine.”
92
In partial response to these critiques, the DOJ has a policy that limits
successive federal prosecutions. Under the so-called “Petite policy,”
93
the
88. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (“The dual sovereignty doctrine, as
originally articulated and consistently applied by this Court, compels the conclusion that
successive prosecutions by two States for the same conduct are not barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.”).
89. Brief of the North American Securities Administrators Association, Amicus Curiae
in Support of the Securities Commissioner of the State of Kansas at 6, State v. Lundberg, 53
Kan. App. 2d 721 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017), No. 15-114897-A (citations omitted).
90. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 2000 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“When the ‘ONE WHOLE’ people of the
United States assigned different aspects of their sovereign power to the federal and state
governments, they sought not to multiply governmental power but to limit it.”).
92. Id. at 1994 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); accord Thomas White, Limitations Imposed
on the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine By Federal and State Governments, 39 N. KY. L. REV.
173, 188 (2011) (“Given the increasing overlap between state and federal criminal laws,
many scholars argue that, even though the dual sovereignty doctrine may have once served a
useful purpose when federal criminal law was limited to conduct pertaining distinctly to the
national government, this is no longer the case with the increasing federalization of criminal
law.”).
93. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530–31 (1960) (“[I]t is the general policy
of the Federal Government ‘that several offenses arising out of a single transaction should
be alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions, a
policy dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly
law enforcement.’ The Solicitor General on behalf of the Government represents this policy
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DOJ will not pursue a successive federal prosecution “based on
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s)” unless (1) the matter
involves “a substantial federal interest”; (2) the prior prosecution “left that
interest demonstrably unvindicated”; (3) the government believes “that the
defendant’s conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible
evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction by
an unbiased trier of fact”; and (4) the prosecution is “approved by the
appropriate Assistant Attorney General.”
94
At oral argument before the
Gamble Court, the government estimated that it authorizes only “about a
hundred” such prosecutions per year.
95
Of note, the Petite policy is merely
a voluntary exercise of prosecutorial discretion; it cannot be invoked by a
defendant as a bar to federal prosecution.
96
Moreover, many states, either via state constitutional provision or
statute, prohibit successive prosecutions for the same offense if the prior
prosecution was resolved on the merits by the federal government or by
another state.
97
For example, California has enacted the following statutory
prohibition on successive prosecutions:
[W]hen an act charged as a public offense is within the
jurisdiction of the United States, or of another state or territory of
the United States, as well as of this state, a conviction or acquittal
thereof in that other jurisdiction is a bar to the prosecution or
indictment in this state.
98
Thus, the potential for a successive prosecution depends on the
identity of the successive sovereign. If the federal government is the
successive sovereign, the prosecution is subject to the Petite policy. If a
as closely related to that against duplicating federal-state prosecutions, which was formally
defined by the Attorney General of the United States in a memorandum to the United States
Attorneys.”).
94. Dept. of Justice, Justice Manual § 9–2.031(A) (rev. July 2009).
95. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1995 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 54).
96. See Dept. of Justice, Justice Manual § 9–2.031(F) (rev. July 2009) (citing authority)
(“All of the federal circuit courts that have considered the question have held that a criminal
defendant can not invoke the Department’s policy as a bar to federal prosecution.”); see also
Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 179 (2004) (hereinafter Podgor, Department) (citing
authority) (“Although the government has discretion to dismiss cases when its Petite policy
is violated, defendants are not afforded this same opportunity.”).
97. See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1995 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Criminal
Defense Experts as Amici Curiae 4–5, and n. 2 & Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici
Curiae 28–30, and nn.6–15) (“And more than half the States forbid successive prosecutions
for all or some offenses previously resolved on the merits by a federal or state court.”).
98. CAL. PENALCODE § 793 (West).
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state is the successive sovereign, it depends whether the state has
prohibited successive prosecutions. If not, then the decision whether to re-
prosecute resides in the discretion of the state prosecutor.
III. THEGOALS OF PROSECUTING SECURITIESCRIMES
Drawing from the policy reasons for enacting and enforcing securities
laws and theories of criminal punishment, I contend that the goals of
prosecuting securities crime are multifaceted, sometimes in tension, and
must be analyzed against the backdrop of the above-described dual-
regulatory, multi-enforcer regime.
A. Purposes of the Securities Laws and Enforcement Thereof
The fundamental purpose of the federal securities laws is “to insure
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.”
99
At
the same time, however, the federal securities laws are intended to promote
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”
100
Sometimes, such as
when increased regulatory burdens are placed on issuers for the benefit of
investors, these purposes are in tension.
State securities laws share the same purposes of protecting investors
and promoting capital formation. For example, the Uniform Securities Act
states that, when a state regulator is considering whether to cooperate and
coordinate with other regulators, the administrator
shall, in its discretion, take into consideration in carrying out the
public interest the following general policies: (1) maximizing
effectiveness of regulation for the protection of investors; (2)
maximizing uniformity in federal and state regulatory standards;
and (3) minimizing burdens on the business of capital formation,
without adversely affecting essentials of investor protection.
101
Securities enforcement, whether public or private, promotes these
goals by deterring violations of the securities laws and by compensating
99. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377, 390 (2014) (quoting U.S. v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77b; see also Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 571 U.S. at 390 (“The dissent
correctly points out that the federal securities laws have another purpose, beyond protecting
investors. Namely, they also seek to protect securities issuers, as well as the investment
advisers, accountants, and brokers who help them sell financial products, from abusive
class-action lawsuits.”).
101. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 608(b) (2002).
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injured investors while ensuring that enforcement does not unduly inhibit
capital formation.
102
The balance among these sometimes-competing
considerations has played out most notably in the regulation of private
securities litigation, including the enactment of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).
103
B. Theories of Criminal Punishment
Criminal prosecution is but one lever within the overall enforcement
landscape, and it serves specific purposes therein. The criminal law plays a
unique role because “conviction for crime is a distinctive and serious
matter—a something, and not a nothing.”
104
For this reason,
criminalization is generally
105
(although not always
106
) reserved for a subset
102. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (“This
Court has long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud
securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement
actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).”).
103. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF.
REP. § 104-369, 31-32, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 0-731 (“Private securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to
rely upon government action. . . . the investing public and the entire U.S. economy have
been injured by the unwillingness of the best qualified persons to serve on boards of
directors and of issuers to discuss publicly their future prospects, because of fear of baseless
and extortionate securities lawsuits.”).
104. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 404 (1958).
105. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Law Models--And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1887 (1992) (“The
overall structure this relationship points toward is a penumbra of civil penalties around an
inner core of fundamental moral precepts enforced by sanctions.”); see also John C. Coffee,
Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 201 (1991) (hereinafter Coffee,
Reflections) (“The relationship of the civil and criminal law here is sequentially interactive:
the civil law experiments with a standard, but at some point it may ‘harden’ into a
community standard that the criminal law can enforce.”); see also Stephen Marks, Utility
and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 215, 233 (1996)
(positing that tort law encompasses both prohibited and conditionally permissible acts and
that criminal law encompasses only prohibited acts, thus implying that criminal law is a
subset of tort law).
106. See Couture, White Collar, supra note 61, at 2 (“Substantive and procedural
differences between criminal and civil treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud
combine to cause the following anomaly: certain false statements to investors may be
actionable criminally--subjecting individual defendants to imprisonment--but not civilly--
leaving victims without remedy.”); see also Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in
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of the conduct that is civilly actionable.
Two classic theories seek to demarcate the conduct that should be
criminalized: a utilitarian theory and a retributive theory. Under the
utilitarian theory, behavior that is socially inefficient, because its harms
exceed its benefits
107
or because it bypasses a market transaction,
108
should
be deterred when the costs of deterrence do not exceed the benefits thereof.
Because criminal conviction imposes a higher social cost than civil
liability,
109
criminalization is only appropriate when the monetary damages
necessary to deter an actor’s inefficient conduct are higher than the actor
could pay
110
and when “gains in crime reduction are greater than the costs
of punishment policy.”
111
In short, the utilitarian theory focuses on the role
Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 29 (1997) (“There is a
distinct oddity here, from the standpoint of traditional distinctions between criminal and
civil law: Historically, we have expected the criminal law to be narrower and more precise
than the law of civil wrongs, but in interpreting RICO, the courts have been distinctly more
comfortable with broad interpretations in criminal cases, and correspondingly more hostile
to civil applications.”).
107. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 172 (1968) (“Usually a belief that other members of society are harmed is the
motivation behind outlawing or otherwise restricting an activity.”).
108. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 208 (4th ed. 1992) (“These
[intentional] torts and the corresponding list of crimes involve not a conflict between
legitimate (productive) activities but a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant in a
setting of low transaction costs.”) (hereinafter Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS); see also
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1195 (1985) (“The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people
from bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange--the ‘market,’ explicit or
implicit--in situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is a more
efficient method of allocating resources than forced exchange.”).
109. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 108, at 222 & 227 (stating that tort
remedies are less costly than criminal fines and that criminal fines are less costly than
imprisonment); see also Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1235 (1985) (“The
imposition of monetary sanctions will be assumed to involve lower social costs than the
imposition of nonmonetary sanctions.”).
110. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 108, at 222 (“Where tort remedies
are an adequate deterrent because optimal tort damages, including any punitive damages, are
within the ability to pay of the potential defendant, there is no need to invoke criminal
penalties . . . .”).
111. Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Theory and Criminal Justice Practice, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74 (2012); see also Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in
Sentencing White-Collar Criminals?, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 27, 40 (2015) (citing Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968))
(“Deterrence, which is an expression of utilitarianism, is a determination that a particular
punishment will be sufficient to create a benefit to society by preventing future misconduct
over the costs of investigating, prosecuting, and (where necessary) incarcerating.”).
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of the criminal law in deterring inefficient behavior.
112
Under the retributive theory, the criminal law is reserved for morally
repugnant behavior, with criminal conviction expressing the moral
condemnation of the community.
113
The criminal punishment of this
behavior “demonstrates the community’s disapproval of the conduct, so
what is communicated to the defendant, and society at large, is the extent of
disapprobation—and even indignation or anger—at what the person did
and how others suffered because of the misconduct.”
114
In short, the
retributive theory focuses on the role of the criminal law in punishing
morally repugnant behavior.
115
The two theories, although with different orientations, interrelate.
First, the socially inefficient behavior to be deterred under the utilitarian
theory aligns with “generally accepted moral principles.”
116
Indeed, under
either theory, “there is little disagreement that desert is necessary to justify
punishment.”
117
Second, the expression of society’s moral condemnation
under the retributive theory has deterrent effects,
118
even if proponents of
112. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State
Constitutions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 43 (2008) (“Utilitarian (or consequentialist)
purposes of punishment focus on the desirable effects (mainly, future crime reduction)
which punishments have on the offender being punished, or on other would-be offenders,
and on the costs and undesired consequences of punishments.); see also Darren Bush, Law
and Economics of Restorative Justice: Why Restorative Justice Cannot and Should Not Be
Solely About Restoration, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 439, 450 (2003) (“[T]he goal of criminal law,
according to economists, should be prevention of the harm from taking place in the first
instance where undertaking the harm would be socially inefficient.”).
113. See Alan C. Michaels, “Rationales” of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a
Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 57 (2000) (“[T]he dominant view today
sees an essential link between punishment and moral wrongdoing.”).
114. Henning, supra note 111, at 41–42.
115. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2000)
(“Retribution, on the other hand, assumes that the criminal should be hurt, and that the
injury caused by the criminal offense calls for a like infliction of injury on the criminal as a
moral penalty.”).
116. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 108, at 261 (“[O]n balance it would
seem that adherence to generally accepted moral principles increases the wealth of society
more than it reduces it”); see also Alvin K. Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic
Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 908 (1985) (“The law-and-
economics explanation of the criminal sanction presupposes the existence of a transaction
structure . . . .But explaining a particular society’s transaction structure requires an
understanding of societal values—a conception of how a society legitimates its transaction
structure.”).
117. Brown, supra note 111, at 76.
118. See Jayme Herschkopf, Morality and Securities Fraud, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 453,
461 (2017) (“And indeed, scholars point out that retributive and condemnatory punishment
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the moral theory do not view those effects as a primary goal of
criminalization. As such, these theories can be melded into a “mixed
theory,” whereby “criminal law is justified both by a commitment to
punishing offenders based on their desert and a commitment that criminal
law should serve some instrumental function, typically crime (or harm)
prevention or preservation of order.”
119
And in practice, both theories inform modern criminal law and
punishment, which incorporate both deterrence and retribution rationales.
120
For example, the United States Sentencing Commission, when drafting the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, acknowledged the theoretical debate
121
but
declined to resolve it “because in most sentencing decisions the application
of either philosophy will produce the same or similar results.”
122
As
another example, the principles of prosecutorial discretion in the Justice
Manual incorporate utilitarian considerations (e.g., “the deterrent effect of
prosecution”) as well as moral ones (e.g., “the nature and seriousness of the
offense” and “the person’s culpability in connection with the offense”).
123
Finally, with the rise of restitution as a component of criminal
sentencing under federal and state law,
124
the criminal law now serves as a
means of compensating at least some victims, even though compensation
was traditionally the province of civil rather than criminal law.
125
This
can have utilitarian results, such as reinforcing respect for the law and thus encouraging
general adherence.”).
119. Brown, supra note 111, at 88.
120. Brown, supra note 111, at 75 (“Anglo-American criminal justice institutions draw
on both instrumental and deontological commitments for their lawmaking, enforcement, and
punishment policies.”).
121. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(3)(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2005)(“Some argue that appropriate punishment should be defined primarily on the basis of
the principle of ‘just deserts.’ Under this principle, punishment should be scaled to the
offender’s culpability and the resulting harms . . . Others argue that punishment should be
imposed primarily on the basis of practical ‘crime control’ considerations. Defendants
sentenced under this scheme should receive the punishment that most effectively lessens the
likelihood of future crime, either by deterring others or incapacitating the defendant.”).
122. Id.
123. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICEMANUAL § 9-27.230 (2019), https://www.justice.gov
/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.230 [https://perma.cc/6TMA-YSBN].
124. SeeAdam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1385, 1390 (2011) (“Recently, another body of law--criminal law--has begun to
assume the same compensatory role as the large private lawsuit. Since 2003, federal
prosecutors increasingly have sought to settle charges with corporate defendants in
exchange for multimillion dollar victim restitution funds--or what we call ‘criminal class
actions.’”); see also id. at 1393 n.33 (“Criminal class actions occur in the state system as
well.”).
125. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 105, at 231 (“[T]ort law and criminal law are
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compensation goal sometimes aligns with deterrence and retribution
rationales by forcing defendants to “bear more of the social cost of the
harm,”
126
and it sometimes works at cross purposes because “imprisoning a
defendant undermines any efforts towards restitution.”
127
Thus, in practice, modern criminal law, including securities crime,
serves utilitarian, retributive, and compensatory goals, albeit sometimes
furthering one purpose over another.
C. Goals of Prosecuting Securities Crime
Drawing from the purposes of the securities laws and enforcement
thereof and the theories of criminal punishment, I contend that the goals of
prosecuting securities crime are multi-faceted and sometimes in tension.
On the one hand, securities crime prosecution should promote the
following aims: (1) specifically and generally deterring violations of the
securities laws; (2) punishing securities law violators, both to further
deterrence and to express society’s condemnation; and (3) compensating
investors who have been harmed by securities violations. On the other
hand, securities crime prosecution should aim to further these purposes (1)
without incurring unnecessary prosecution or punishment costs and (2)
without unduly inhibiting capital formation.
Moreover, when states are prosecuting securities crimes, they should
recognize that, rather than acting in isolation, they are acting within the
above-described dual-regulatory, multi-enforcer regime. Ideally, state
securities prosecutions, alongside other federal and state enforcement by
public and private parties, would be calibrated so as to balance
appropriately these sometimes-competing goals.
128
Many scholars have
institutionally segregated so that one focuses principally on compensation and the other
principally on deterrence.”); Lynch, supra note106, at 27 (“The traditional rough distinction
between criminal and civil matters has been that criminal actions are brought by the
sovereign to punish and deter violations of social norms, while civil actions are brought by
private parties (or occasionally by the government in a proprietary or administrative
capacity) to compensate those who have suffered damage or to prevent harms from
occurring.”).
126. Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 124, at 1412.
127. J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael,
Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 102 (2007).
128. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal Liability,
Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1478 (2009)
(“Ideally, the three enforcement mechanisms, regulatory, civil, and criminal, work in
tandem to prevent business misconduct through a system of graduated penalties . . . In sum,
a comprehensive strategy would provide several sources of intervention, offer remedies
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argued, however, that enforcement within this dual-regulatory, multi-
enforcer regime is not appropriately calibrated. For example, scholars have
debated whether private securities litigation is too expansive or too
constrained;
129
whether the SEC is under-enforcing or over-enforcing;
130
whether state civil enforcement of securities laws is too aggressive or too
lax,
131
and whether federal prosecutors are over- or under-prosecuting
securities crime.
132
scaled to wrongdoing, and send a single deterrent message that strengthens business norms
to support law-abiding behavior.”).
129. E.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2201–02 (2010) (hereinafter
Rose, Multienforcer) (“Private enforcers could not be expected to use their discretion to
balance concerns for underdeterrence and enforcement costs the way our idealized public
enforcer could.”); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers
to Remedies for Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 91 (2012) (“As a result
of access barriers that largely substitute the district judge as the fact-finder on a motion to
dismiss, class certification, and summary judgment, injured investors face significant
obstacles to recovery under Rule 10b-5.”).
130. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have A Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 729 (2009) (“This marked variation in
enforcement intensity leads to an obvious policy debate: Does the United States
overenforce? Or, does the rest of the world underenforce?”).
131. E.g., Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2228 (“In light of these observations,
there is no reason to accept the current allocation of enforcement authority in the United
States as sacrosanct. Rather, we should give thoughtful consideration to consolidating
enforcement authority in a single federal regulator, such as the SEC, while at the same time
adopting reforms to align the federal enforcer’s incentives more closely with the public
interest (so as to offset any increased risk of underdeterrence this change might
introduce).”); David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1464–65
(2014) (“The states have generally not stepped in where the federal agencies have feared to
tread, though this is often thought to be a potential check on failure to regulate on the
national level.”).
132. E.g., Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization
Without Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 459, 504 (2010) (“The criminal law is a blunt
instrument when applied to problems created by agency costs because of the crudeness of its
sanctions and their relatively high cost without demonstrable gain. Further, since white-
collar wrongs are not always morally wrong, the criminal law’s expressive and coercive
powers are seriously undermined by the crude application of criminal sanctions.”); Zaring,
supra note 131, at 1410 (“But the handling of this crisis suggests that the government has
changed its approach from one seeking prison time to one satisfied with corporate fines,
usually extracted through settlements paired with so-called deferred prosecution agreements
(‘DPAs’), which are commitments by the companies that settle to change their internal
practices in a way that limits the potential for future law breaking.”).
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IV. PRINCIPLES FOR STATE PROSECUTION OF SECURITIESCRIME
Against this backdrop, I focus on an oft-ignored lever within this dual-
regulatory, multi-enforcer regime: state prosecution of securities crimes.
Rather than proposing a more directive solution, I propose principles of
prosecutorial discretion designed to guide state prosecutors when balancing
the multi-faceted and competing goals of prosecuting securities crimes
within this regime.
A. The Importance of States’ Prosecutorial Discretion When
Prosecuting Securities Crimes
Prosecutors must “make decisions regarding which cases will be
prosecuted out of the many which could be prosecuted.”
133
According to
former prosecutor Kenneth J. Melilli, “[t]he decision to charge an
individual with a crime is the most important function exercised by a
prosecutor.”
134
As recognized by the Supreme Court, prosecutors have “‘broad
discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”
135
“[S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or
bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”
136
The
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is limited only by “constitutional
constraints.”
137
Principles of prosecutorial discretion are an important tool to promote
uniformity and accountability in charging decisions,
138
lest non-uniform
prosecutorial decisions “reduce[] the public’s perception that the legal
system employs a fair and ethical process.”
139
Accordingly, the American
133. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1243, 1244
(2011).
134. Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, BYU L. REV.
669, 671 (1992).
135. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n. 11 (1982)).
136. Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
137. Id. at 608 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)).
138. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 837, 871 (“Requiring prosecutors to follow neutral principles empowers the public to
evaluate the bases for prosecutorial conduct and to assess whether a prosecutor has correctly
and consistently applied the principles in particular cases.”).
139. Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary
Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2000) [hereinafter Podgor, Ethics].
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Bar Association (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
Function state that “[e]ach prosecutor’s office should seek to develop
general policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and
standard operating procedures for the office.”
140
For example, at the federal
level, the Justice Manual contains principles for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, including the aforementioned Petite policy.
141
Principles of prosecutorial discretion generally begin with high-level
objectives. For example, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution Function state that the “objectives of such policies and
procedures should be to achieve fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of
the criminal law within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.”
142
Similarly, the
Justice Manual’s principles of prosecutorial discretion are intended to
“promote the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial authority and contribute to
the fair, evenhanded administration of the federal criminal laws.”
143
But, in order for principles of prosecutorial discretion to be
effective,
144
they must also include specific subprinciples,
145
potentially
even statute-specific ones.
146
As recognized by the Supreme Court,
relevant specific factors include “the strength of the case, the prosecution’s
general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan.”
147
Other relevant factors include the theoretical underpinnings of criminal
law,
148
the availability of civil enforcement as an alternative to criminal
140. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
4TH ED., § 3-2.4(A) (2015).
141. DEP’T OF JUSTICEMANUAL § 9-27.001 ET SEQ.
142. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
4TH ED., § 3-2.4(A) (2015).
143. DEP’T JUSTICEMANUAL § 9-27.001 (UPDATED FEB. 2018).
144. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 138, at 896 (“Standing alone, they [first-order
principles] are of dubious value precisely because they are so broad and overarching.”).
145. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 138 at 896 (“These [principles] likely will apply
more narrowly, but also may focus more specifically on the factors that society wishes
prosecutors to implement or ignore.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1562–63 (1981) (“At the core of a system limiting
discretion should be prosecutors’ own guidelines indicating how they will make charging
and bargaining decisions. These should be specific enough to provide genuine guidance
when applied to a particular set of facts.”).
146. See Podgor, Ethics, supra note 139, at 1517 (“In not providing guidance that is
specific to a case, or at least to particular statutes, consistency in the decision-making
process is not achieved.”).
147. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
148. See Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 275 (1998) (“Prosecutors in charging and plea bargaining, much
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prosecution (particularly in the context of white collar crime),
149
and the
opportunity cost of expending resources on one prosecution over another.
150
Prosecutors also take into account broader societal considerations
when exercising their discretion,
151
including whether the criminal law is
overly broad,
152
unduly punitive,
153
or out-of-step with current societal
views.
154
On the positive side, a prosecutor’s consideration of broader
societal values can “serve as a much needed safety valve for when an
otherwise justified prosecution does not serve societal needs.”
155
On the
negative side, however, it can usurp the role of the legislature
156
and relieve
like judges in sentencing, presumably are motivated by a disparate mixture of philosophies
and aims, including deterrence, retribution or just desserts, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.”).
149. Podgor, Ethics, supra note 139, at 1519 (“The prosecutor’s discretionary is
magnified in the white collar crime context, where the characterization of conduct as
criminal instead of tortious may be within the prosecutor’s realm of decision-making.”).
150. Fairfax, supra note 133, at 1257 (“Prosecutors often must decide not to pursue one
matter (or category of matters) in order to have the investigative or prosecutorial capacity to
prosecute other matters deemed to be of higher priority.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the “Evolution” of A White-Collar
Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 19 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Metastasis] (“Desirable as it
may be to punish the wicked, one cannot ignore that the supply of such persons vastly
exceeds available prosecutorial resources.”); see also Vorenberg, supra note 145, at 1542–
43 (“Funding levels determine how many cases can be brought and inevitably force
prosecutors’ offices to give little or no attention to many chargeable crimes.”).
151. Melilli, supra note 134, at 674 (“If discretion to charge is justified, then that
justification necessarily extends to the discretion not to charge. And that discretion justifies
not only eliminating unprovable cases but also protecting citizens from charges that do not
advance societal interests.”); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous
Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 250 (1988) (arguing that,
when making decisions absent “adversary system safeguards,” prosecutors should act with
“impartial, judge-like neutrality” and incorporate a “moral point of view”).
152. Podgor, Department, supra note 96, at 173 (citing the Department of Justice’s
guidelines on RICO prosecutions as an example of “offer[ing] internal constraints to overly
broad statutes”).
153. See Melilli, supra note 134, at 674 (noting that prosecutorial discretion includes
“decisions to charge felony sales of small quantities of controlled substances as
misdemeanor possessions”).
154. Fairfax, supra note 133, at 1260 (“Some criminal laws remain on the statute books
but are not enforced because they no longer comport with modern societal values.”); see
Melilli, supra note 135, at 674 (noting that prosecutorial discretion includes “decisions not
to enforce anachronistic penal laws like adultery”).
155. Fairfax, supra note 133, at 1274.
156. Coffee, Reflections, supra note 105, at 241 (“Yet, for prosecutors to decide
systematically not to prosecute what the legislature has deemed criminal is also a politically
dangerous act, one that seems to undermine the legislature’s position as the sovereign
lawmaker.”).
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the pressure on the legislature to reform outdated, unduly punitive, or
overly broad laws.
157
State prosecutors’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion is an important
lever within the overall dual-regulatory, multi-enforcer securities regime
because “[h]ow the law is enforced can influence behavior as much as, and
sometimes even more than, how the law is written.”
158
Certainly, parties
“bargain in the shadow of the law,”
159
and thus the laws on the books affect
parties’ conduct. Yet, as explained by Amanda M. Rose, “[t]he particular
misconduct that enforcers choose to target, their investigative methods, the
type and level of sanctions that they seek to have imposed (whether
judicially or through settlement), and the frequency at which they choose to
prosecute can powerfully affect the behavior of regulated parties.”
160
In
other words, the laws on the books are weaponized or neutralized via
prosecutorial discretion, for good or for ill.
161
Moreover, relying on prosecutorial discretion to calibrate state
criminal prosecution within this dual-regulatory, multi-enforcer regime is
nimbler than more directive approaches like amending state securities laws
or preempting state criminal enforcement thereof. State prosecutors can
respond quickly to new data about benefits and harms of prosecution, as
well as to adjustments in other enforcement levers within the regime, such
as changes in the scope of private civil liability or in federal enforcement
priorities.
162
Admittedly, relying on principles of prosecutorial discretion to
157. Fairfax, supra note 133, at 1274–75; Vorenberg, supra note 145, at 1552 (“Not only
is the prosecutor overruling the legislature’s judgment; he may be preempting as well the
only method for bringing home to the legislature the impact of its tough stance.”).
158. Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1353.
159. Coffee, Metastasis, supra note 150, at 9 n.41 (“So long as the parties bargain in the
shadow of the law, the full impact of a statutory change cannot be assessed simply by
looking at those who are prosecuted.”).
160. Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1353; see also Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein,
Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9, 10 (2010) (“Violators know that they will avoid
punishment if their violations do not stand out as rampant relative to what other violators do.
This knowledge motivates violators to reduce the intensity of their unlawful activity from
the high-end zone to the inconspicuous level.”).
161. Brown, supra note 111, at 82 (“Charging discretion in the Anglo-American system
lets enforcement officials substantially shape criminal law’s priorities, a task more often
taken on by legislatures and trial adjudication in systems that lack such discretion.”).
162. See Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2196–97 (arguing for a single federal
enforcer) (“[T]he enforcer could respond to new information regarding the social costs from
fraud and overdeterrence in real time by ratcheting up or down its enforcement efforts or by
changing the amount or type of sanctions it pursues. Similarly, it could alter the types of
frauds and defendants it prosecutes most aggressively.”).
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channel state prosecution within this dual-regulatory, multi-enforcer regime
assumes an idealized version of the state prosecutor. In short, this ideal
state prosecutor is a “rational bureaucrat,”
163
is not captured by industry,
164
is not seeking free-rider benefits,
165
is not succumbing to political
pressure,
166
is not seeking self-aggrandizement,
167
is not “chickenshit”
about losing cases,
168
is not caught up in a fervor to indict “someone for
163. See Coffee, Metastasis, supra note 150, at 22 (“One could sketch a model of the
prosecutor as a rational bureaucrat, who considers whether the product of each additional
increment of time and effort will exceed its marginal cost. Such model would, of course, be
overly idealized, because such perfect efficiency is never obtainable.”).
164. See Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2137 (2015)
(“If the public is the principal, acting through the government as its agent, capture occurs
when the agent stops seeking to serve the goals of the principal and instead pursues the ends
of a third party. For administrative agencies, the key third parties are regulated entities–
agencies get captured when they become controlled by those industries they regulate.”);
Moohr, supra note 128, at 1478 (“Regulatory agencies charged with monitoring business
financial conduct are beset with inherent barriers to effective enforcement and are swept by
political winds, often resulting in weak enforcement.”); Mark Totten, The Enforcers & the
Great Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1658 (2015) (“When federal regulators are
captured and fail to take necessary actions to protect consumers, at least a few states are
likely to enter the enforcement gap. . . . No individual state AG is per se resistant to
capture—and a recent investigative report has documented the previously unrecognized
influence of lobbying on the state AG world—but understood collectively it is likely that at
least a few states will act.”).
165. See James J. Park, Securities Enforcement in Extraordinary Times: A Comment on
Rose and Leblanc’s Policing Public Companies, 63 FLA. L. REV. F. 1, 3 (2011) (“Multiple
suits are most troubling when one enforcer is a free-rider, bringing a concurrent suit based
on another enforcer’s investigation, to obtain significant benefits for itself.”); Rose, State,
supra note 14, at 1402 (“Nothing formally prevents a state regulator from free-riding on the
investigative efforts of the SEC, the private bar, or other state regulators by filing a follow-
on suit to recover a quick fine for the state fisc, while adding little to the deterrence mix. . . .
One would hope that a general concern for the national welfare on the part of state
regulators keeps this sort of strategic activity to a minimum.”).
166. See Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2223 (“Voter preferences might also
lead state officials to favor excessive enforcement, if being responsive to voters happens to
be officials’ political support-maximizing strategy. As explained above, because fraud is
more salient than overdeterrence, voters are likely to overweigh underdeterrence costs
relative to enforcement costs.”).
167. See Coffee, Metastasis, supra note 150, at 21 (“Second, careerist motives may
encourage the individual prosecutor to stalk the ‘big kill’—typically, a highly visible
business or political figure—even if the evidence ultimately obtained shows misconduct that
is relatively modest in proportion to other violations by less notable persons. Successful
prosecution of a highly visible defendant can significantly advance a prosecutor’s career.”);
Vorenberg, supra note 145, at 1545 (“Human nature being what it is, people rarely give up
power voluntarily, and thus the capacity of self-regulation to remove prosecutorial abuse
and arbitrariness from the criminal justice system is limited.”).
168. JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO
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something,”
169
is capable of considering the benefits and harms of
prosecution holistically,
170
and is willing to consider his or her role within
the overall national scheme of securities regulation.
171
Yet, without principles of prosecutorial discretion responsive to the
dual-regulatory, multi-enforcer regime of securities regulation, even such
an ideal prosecutor may make missteps.
172
Thus, I seek to provide that
guidance, both to inform state prosecutors and to serve as a benchmark to
assess states’ prosecutorial decisions. If those decisions fall short, perhaps
there is room for a more directive solution, even though it would not be as
nimble.
Of note, when applied to the state prosecution of securities crime,
principles of prosecutorial discretion usually apply at two levels–at the
agency level when the state securities regulator is considering whether to
make a criminal referral and at the prosecutor level upon receiving such a
referral.
173
But, state prosecutors can charge securities crimes without such
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES, xiv-xv (2017) (recounting that then-U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, James Comey, characterized prosecutors who had never lost a case as
members of the “Chickenshit Club.”).
169. See Coffee, Metastasis, supra note 150, at 21 (“The momentum to indict someone
for something can often be irresistible.”); see also Fisher, supra note 151, at 206 (discussing
how “[t]he internal climate of prosecution agencies may also promote ‘conviction
psychology’”).
170. See Minzner, supra note 164, at 2145 (“Enforcement targets will always see cases
holistically, aggregating the direct and collateral costs in determining how to proceed. In
comparison, enforcement agencies cannot take a holistic approach. Almost by definition,
only the direct consequences of an agency enforcement action are within its control. The
collateral consequences lie outside its jurisdiction.”).
171. See Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2206 (“No individual state would fully
capture the benefits of designing an ‘optimal’ liability regime for deterring fraud in the
national securities markets, as those benefits would spill over to the national economy.”);
Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1353–54 (“Federal and state enforcers are likely to have
differing policy perspectives for a variety of reasons. For example, federal enforcers should
be concerned with maximizing national welfare, whereas state enforcers should be
concerned with maximizing the welfare of their particular state. This may lead states to
pursue actions that are in their parochial interest, but which are not in the best interest of the
nation as a whole.”).
172. See Strader, supra note 127, at 98 (“Prosecutorial discretion may seem a thin reed
upon which to hang hopes of reforming white collar criminalization. Much has been written
on prosecutorial discretion, but so far no principled system has been implemented for
preventing abuse of discretion. . . . Yet, at least at the federal level, there is some cause for
hope. The prosecutorial guidelines set forth in the U.S. Attorneys Manual attempt to provide
some principled restraints on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”).
173. SeeMinzner, supra note 164, at 2122–23 (“Enforcers must first decide the scope of
liability. This initial charging decision requires a choice about which defendants to pursue
and which defendants to ignore. As a practical matter, every enforcement agency sees more
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a referral.
174
As such, these principles of prosecutorial discretion are
broadly drafted to apply both to state regulators when making criminal
referrals and to state prosecutors when deciding whether to pursue criminal
charges, whether pursuant to a referral or not.
B. Proposed Principles for State Prosecution of Securities Crime
I propose a three-step analysis to guide state prosecutors when
exercising their prosecutorial discretion with respect to securities crime.
The three steps should be applied sequentially to reach a final charging
decision. Step One incorporates the multi-faceted goals of prosecuting
securities crime into general principles of prosecutorial discretion,
175
ignoring the dual-regulatory and multi-enforcer regime in which a state
prosecutor operates. Step Two layers on the multi-enforcer component of
that regime, and Step Three incorporates the dual-regulatory aspect of that
regime.
Step One: Assuming that this potential criminal charge would be the
only enforcement of any kind and assuming that the conduct is also
criminalized under federal law, consider the benefits and harms of
prosecution. Only if the benefits exceed the harms should the state
prosecute.
Discussion of Step One
In this step, prosecutors should engage in a comprehensive analysis of
the benefits and harms of prosecution, in light of the goals of prosecuting
securities crime. For purposes of this step, prosecutors should not consider
any concurrent enforcement against this perpetrator, and prosecutors should
assume that state law is coextensive with federal law. Below are the key
benefits and harms of prosecuting securities crime.
violations than it can charge, so some potential defendants will be allowed to escape. These
decisions are perhaps the classic example of prosecutorial discretion by public enforcers.
This choice belongs to the enforcement agency alone. Both in the civil and criminal context,
decisions not to charge are effectively unreviewable.”).
174. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 508(B) (2002) (“The [Attorney General or the proper
prosecuting attorney] with or without a reference from the administrator, may institute
criminal proceedings under this [Act].”).
175. Brown, supra note 111, at 74 (“[P]rosecutors (and also, to various degrees, police
and regulatory officials) weigh a set of familiar considerations: harm, blameworthiness,
deterrent effects, alternative remedies or policy options, and resource constraints.”).
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Benefits
Deterrence
The first potential benefit of prosecution is deterring similar conduct
in the future, both by this perpetrator and by others. In order to appreciate
the potential deterrent effects of prosecution, it is necessary to consider (1)
the harms to society if this conduct were to reoccur; (2) the potential impact
of criminal prosecution on deterring this perpetrator from similar conduct
in the future (i.e., specific deterrence); and (3) the potential impact of
criminal prosecution on deterring others from similar conduct in the future
(i.e., general deterrence).
First, the societal harm flowing from the conduct depends on the type
of securities crime at issue. For example, securities fraud hurts defrauded
investors by depriving them of accurate information to make investment
decisions, potentially resulting in the loss of the invested funds themselves,
as well as the lost opportunity to invest in honest investments that might
perform better than the one influenced by fraud. Securities fraud harms
society more broadly by diverting scarce investment funds from honest
investments into fraudulent ones.
176
Securities fraud also harms society
because other investors, in response to markets in which fraud is present,
may require a so-called “fraud discount” or exit the markets altogether,
thus raising the cost of capital and limiting its flow.
177
As another example,
the offer or sale of unregistered, non-exempt securities potentially harms
the investors who participate in the offering because the registration and
exemption rules attempt to ensure that the information provided to
investors correlates with their level of financial sophistication and risk
tolerance.
178
Thus, investors who participate in unregistered, non-exempt
offerings may participate in unsuitable investments without appreciating
176. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358 (1999) (“Ideally, society would
want to implement all proposed projects in rank order of their risk-adjusted expected returns
(based on all available information, including what is known by the managers proposing
each project).”).
177. See Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2180 (“By successfully deterring fraud,
it would bring skittish investors back to the capital markets, reduce the ‘fraud discount’ they
may otherwise be inclined to charge, and generally improve corporate governance.
Allocative distortions would thereby be minimized, and the cost of capital reduced.”).
178. See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953) (“The design of the
statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary
to informed investment decisions. The natural way to interpret the private offering
exemption is in light of the statutory purpose. . . . An offering to those who are shown to be
able to fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering.’”).
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the risks thereof.
Second, criminal prosecution may further specific deterrence.
Relevant to this inquiry is the likelihood that the perpetrator, if not
prosecuted, will reoffend. The perpetrator’s history of prior securities
violations is especially relevant here, as there is data to suggest that there is
a subset of so-called “securities fraud recidivists.”
179
A criminal conviction
for a securities-related crime, even if not accompanied by imprisonment,
bars people from participating in many securities-related industries, thus
potentially preventing the perpetrator from reoffending.
180
In addition, white collar offenders are especially sensitive to the
potential for imprisonment,
181
potentially increasing the deterrent effect of a
criminal prosecution.
Third, criminal prosecution will likely further general deterrence. A
securities-related prosecution is likely to scare other potential violators,
especially white collar ones,
182
enhancing its general deterrence impact.
Although some potential offenders are unlikely to be deterred by the
prospect of prosecution,
183
a subset will adjust their conduct in response to
criminal prosecution.
184
179. See Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113 PENN ST.
L. REV. 189, 191–92 (2008) (“[P]opulation of offenders who engage repeatedly in retail
securities fraud—securities fraud recidivists” will often “receive two, three, or even more
sequential civil sanctions before the Department of Justice initiates criminal prosecution.”);
see also Sally S. Simpson, Making Sense of White-Collar Crime: Theory and Research, 8
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 481, 485 (2011) (“Although most scholarship in the field tends to be
more conceptual and qualitative in nature, the few systematic quantitative studies that have
been conducted have produced some uniform findings: . . . a large percent of offenders are
recidivists.”).
180. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(39)(F) & 78o(b)(4)(B) (disqualifying any person from
membership in a self-regulatory organization if, within the past ten years, the person has
been convicted of any offense involving the purchase or sale of any security).
181. See Strader, supra note 127, at 55 (“[T]he vast majority of white collar defendants
would undoubtedly prefer fines and other civil sanctions to jail time and the taint of being
branded a felon. There is simply no doubt that defendants in parallel administrative, civil,
and criminal proceedings consider criminal sanctions to be of a qualitatively different order
than civil and administrative sanctions.”).
182. Strader, supra note 127, at 55.
183. Barnard, supra note 179, at 192 (suggesting that “[M]any individuals who engage
in securities fraud—and especially securities fraud recidivists—may be ‘hard-wired’ to
engage in fraudulent schemes.”).
184. See Henning, supra note 111, at 35 (“[P]eople who operate in the white-collar
world seem to be the likeliest candidates to be aware of a prison sentence imposed on
someone in the same industry, and to respond by avoiding future misconduct, even for
actions that may appear to be typical in the modern business environment.”).
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Retribution
The second potential benefit of prosecution is retributive—expressing
society’s approbation of immoral conduct. The degree to which this
potential benefit is implicated depends on the facts of the securities crime
at issue. For example, some species of securities fraud—such as Ponzi
schemes—likely involve immoral conduct, while others—such as reckless
financial statements—may not.
185
Relevant factors include: (1) whether the
fraud involved an abuse of trust; (2) whether the fraud involved especially
vulnerable victims, such as the elderly; (3) the perpetrator’s mental state;
and (4) the scope of the loss, if any, to victims. The sale of unregistered,
non-exempt securities is less likely to involve immoral conduct than
securities fraud, unless the above factors suggest that the conduct was
unusually brazen.
Compensation
The third potential benefit of criminal prosecution is compensatory.
Relevant factors include: (1) the scope of the loss; (2) whether the
perpetrator has assets that could be used to accomplish restitution; and (3)
whether the victims are identifiable.
Harms
Costs of Prosecution and Punishment
The first potential harm of criminal prosecution is the diversion of
resources to prosecute and punish this perpetrator as opposed to other
perpetrators.
186
Securities crime cases are often document-intensive, may
require expert witnesses, and may require greater time to prepare and try
than other cases.
187
In addition, as with any criminal prosecution that may
185. See Henning, supra note 111, at 55 (“[M]any white-collar offenses do not provoke
the type of moral opprobrium attached to a crime like murder or assault, so individuals may
not comprehend how their conduct can be viewed as criminal or subject them to a
conviction rather than, at most, a civil penalty. And when the violation revolves around the
application of technical rules, one can readily see how a defendant might reasonably
conclude that there was no criminal conduct involved.”).
186. See Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2184 (“Direct enforcement costs
include the resources consumed in detecting, prosecuting, defending, and adjudicating
securities fraud cases.”).
187. See John Hasnas, Foreword to Corporate Criminality: Legal, Ethical and
Managerial Implications, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 1269, 1269–70 (2007). (“Considerable
investigation may be required to even establish that a crime has been committed, and a great
deal of legal and accounting sophistication may be required to unravel the deception.
Prosecuting such cases is necessarily an expensive and time-consuming task.”).
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result in imprisonment, the cost of incarceration is a factor.
Over-Deterrence Costs
The second potential harm of criminal prosecution is the risk of over-
deterrence costs. Such costs are imposed when other actors, in response to
an enforcement action and out of fear of being subject to enforcement
themselves,
188
over-correct their own conduct in a way that is not socially
beneficial. For example, other actors could respond to a securities fraud
prosecution by over-investing in precautionary measures, thus increasing
the cost of capital, or over- or under-disclosing, thus reducing share price
accuracy.
189
Professor Rose summarized the potential over-deterrence costs
associated with securities fraud prosecutions as follows:
The risk of these sorts of mistaken fraud prosecutions can
produce over-deterrence costs that look very much like the
under-deterrence costs the system is meant to prevent. If
regulators aggressively pursue forecasts and other opinions, it
may prompt even honest individuals to disclose less of this type
of information, impeding share price accuracy. Conversely, the
aggressive pursuit of omissions might cause individuals to spend
too much firm money in the production of information, or to
flood the market with trivial information—which can likewise
impede share price accuracy. Less accurate share prices mean, in
turn, less allocative efficiency in the economy and a higher cost
of capital. The risk of erroneous fraud liability might also lead
firms to spend more money scrubbing documents for accuracy
188. See Coffee, Metastasis, supra note 150, at 9 (“Yet, by introducing the threat of
criminal sanction, there is an impact not only on those who are guilty of misconduct, but
also on those who are risk averse and insist on arranging their affairs so as to avoid any
chance of entanglement with the criminal law.”).
189. SeeRose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2184 (“[O]verdeterrence produces some
of the very same social costs as securities fraud itself: it can increase the cost of capital (e.g.,
if fear of liability causes companies to overinvest in precautionary measures or causes
financial intermediaries to charge more for their services) and upset the allocative efficiency
of the economy (e.g., if fear of liability causes companies to reduce disclosure of truthful
information or, conversely, to disclose too much trivial information, thereby impeding
share-price accuracy).”); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market
Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 652 (1996). (“[T]here are significant costs
associated with precaution in the face of excessive liability. Accounting and legal fees are
higher. Managers will tend either to disclose too much (which is at least costly, often
contrary to the company’s business interests, and perhaps misleading by virtue of the
dilution effect) or to say little or nothing at all when they want to keep secrets for fear of the
uncertain consequences of addressing a subject in the first place given the dimly illuminated
margins of the half-truth doctrine and the duty to update.”).
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than is socially optimal. In addition, financial intermediaries
might charge firms more for their services as compensation for
the risk of erroneous aiding and abetting liability. Finally, when
vicarious liability is a feature of the system, excessive sanctions
might cause firms to overinvest in measures to prevent fraud and
misrepresentation, even absent a risk of legal error.
190
Similarly, other actors could respond to a prosecution for offering or
selling unregistered, non-exempt securities in two costly ways: (1) over-
complying with an exemption (such as by refraining from selling to any
non-accredited investors even if a limited number of such sales are
permitted by the exemption), thus increasing the cost of capital; or (2)
refraining from selling securities altogether, thus restricting the growth of
the economy.
191
Because all other regulated parties may respond to a single
prosecution, the over-deterrence costs from a single prosecution can be
exponential.
192
However, not all crimes, including securities crimes, pose the risk of
over-deterrence costs. There are two prerequisites in order for over-
deterrence costs to be a concern: (1) the law must be murky or subject to
legal error;
193
and (2) the conduct at issue must be “priced” rather than
“prohibited” via criminalization.
194
First, over-deterrence costs only pose a risk if regulated parties are
unsure about how to comply with the law or fear that they will be
mistakenly found not to have complied. If the law is clear and unlikely to
be applied in error, “[r]egulated parties can avoid sanction with
confidence. . . .”
195
For example, there are unlikely to be over-deterrence
costs associated with prosecuting the perpetrator of a Ponzi scheme or
someone selling securities via the internet without attempting to satisfy an
190. Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1381.
191. See John Herbert Roth, The Effective Counselor, 77 ALA. LAW. 188, 192 (2016).
(“[L]awyers and compliance professionals tend to be more risk averse because we are
trained to spot and plan for the worst possible outcomes. In simplified terms, we see the
landscape as being covered with landmines, at least one of which is expected to explode.”).
192. See Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2184 (“[A]ll regulated parties may
potentially produce overdeterrence costs. Lawmakers should therefore pay close attention
to these costs lest the securities fraud deterrence regime ends up doing more harm to the
economy than good.”).
193. See Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1365 (“If the law identifies the behavior to be
proscribed with specificity, and the risk of legal error and misguided prosecution is low
(which is likely to be the case with a very specific law), unleashing multiple enforcers is less
worrisome.”).
194. Coffee, Reflections, supra note 105, at 196.
195. Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1365.
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exemption from registration that permits general solicitation or
advertising.
196
On the other hand, there is a risk of over-deterrence costs if
prosecuting someone who spoke recklessly or negligently, rather than
knowingly or intentionally; who sold interests that qualify as securities
only under an expansive interpretation of “investment contract;” or who
sold securities via a word-of-mouth network that just crossed the line into
“general solicitation or advertising.”
197
Second, over-deterrence costs only pose a risk if the conduct is
“priced” rather than “prohibited” by criminalization.
198
As John C. Coffee,
Jr. has explained, the modern criminal law serves both roles.
199
For
conduct that has no social value, the criminal law prohibits it.
200
In this
scenario, there is no risk of over-deterrence because the conduct is so
contrary to community standards that society wants potential perpetrators
to avoid it at all costs.
201
Examples of “prohibited” conduct in the securities context are so-
called “true crimes”
202
or “real frauds”
203
like Ponzi schemes
204
and pump-
196. See Langevoort, supra note 189, at 658–59 (“Given scienter’s slippery character, it
is appropriate to distinguish between those frauds that are truly deliberate (having something
like malice aforethought) and those where there is a more significant risk of judicial error or
legitimate cause for uncertainty on matters such as materiality or duty. Drawing this
distinction reduces the risk of overprecaution: there is far less cause for concern with respect
to the truly deliberate scheme.”).
197. See Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2193 (“[T]he overdeterrence risks
discussed above are all traceable to a single source: regulated parties’ fear of falsely positive
scienter determinations.”).
198. See Minzner, supra note 164, at 2129 (“In this framework, enforcers can set the
penalties either to require the violator to internalize the costs caused by the violation or deter
it completely.”).
199. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 105, at 239 (“Ideally, criminal legislation might
therefore distinguish two grades of the crime of toxic dumping: the higher grade requiring a
subjective perception by the defendant of the serious risk of harm to others, and the lower
grade not. The former might be ‘prohibited,’ and the latter ‘priced.’”).
200. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 105, at 239 (“Generally, society seeks to
prohibit (rather than price) those activities that violate fundamental community standards.”).
201. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 105, at 195 (“Because society has refused on
moral grounds to recognize the legitimacy of the benefit to the defendant in these cases, then
by definition the benefits of the crime to the individual can never exceed the costs it imposes
on society. Thus, the criminal law threatens the defendant with a much sharper, more
discontinuous jump in the costs that the defendant will incur for its violation than does tort
law, because the criminal law has little reason to fear overdeterrence (that is, the chilling of
socially valuable behavior) within its appropriate domain.”).
202. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 105, at 195 (arguing that “‘true’ crimes” are
those that “society wishes to prohibit, not price”).
203. See Urska Velikonja, Behind the Annual SEC Enforcement Report: 2017 and
Beyond, Part I (Nov. 22, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/11/22/be
2019] PRINCIPLES FOR STATE PROSECUTION OF SECURITIESCRIME 69
and-dump schemes.
205
For conduct that has social value but also poses the
risk of social harm, the criminal law “prices” the conduct, thus forcing
actors to internalize the social cost of their conduct.
206
In this scenario,
there is a risk of over-deterrence costs if the potential criminal penalty
exceeds the social harm of the conduct.
207
Examples of “priced” conduct in
the securities context are negligent misrepresentations and the negligent
failure to comply with an exemption from registration. This prerequisite
merges with the first because conduct is more likely to be “priced” rather
than “prohibited” if the law is unclear,
208
and often the dividing line
depends on the applicable mental state.
209
hind-the-annual-sec-enforcement-report-2017-and-beyond-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/EX5U-V
RAT] (“In the second half of 2017, the SEC moved aggressively against offering fraud,
pump-and-dump schemes, and the like—the sorts of cases that Chair Clayton has described
as ‘real frauds.’ Cases such as these have always been the bread and butter of SEC
enforcement. They are not just securities violations but crimes; the SEC usually joins forces
with prosecutors who file a criminal case against the same defendant(s), often on the same
day.”).
204. See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 539 (2011)
(“Everyone knows operating a billion-dollar Ponzi scheme is not only fraudulent, but
wrongful.”).
205. See id. at 529 (“Core frauds require everything needed to establish a
misrepresentation, plus something more that, in general, is highly significant in law: the
actor’s level of mental state, fault, culpability, or moral blameworthiness.”).
206. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 105, at 228 (“The negligent defendant is
frequently engaged in activities that have social utility and, indeed, is the same person with
whom the law of torts regularly deals. Hence, to the extent that these forms of misbehavior
are considered ‘crimes,’ the law should ‘price’ the misbehavior—that is, seek to force the
defendant to internalize the costs it imposes on others.”).
207. See id. (“All arguments have their logical limits, and the claim that the criminal law
should prohibit rather than price misbehavior has its doctrinal boundaries also. Normally,
when we think of the criminal law, we visualize it punishing intentional actions willfully
engaged in by the defendant. Yet, the criminal law also can be used to punish negligent acts,
to impose strict liability, and to hold persons vicariously liable for the acts of others. In such
circumstances, the statement that the criminal law should treat the defendant’s conduct as
lacking social utility (and therefore should impose high penalties without concern for
overdeterrence) makes little sense.”).
208. See id. (“The mere fact that conduct is in violation of a known and valid legal
standard is insufficient, because sometimes society may wish only to price such
violations. . . . Ultimately, pricing is necessary on moral as well as economic grounds when
sufficiently clear partitions cannot be erected between the unlawful behavior and closely
related lawful behavior to justify a prohibitory policy. Unfortunately, this condition holds
true throughout much of the ‘white collar’ criminal context.”).
209. See id. (“Put simply, the existence or non-existence of criminal intent supplies a
traditional jury issue that also furnishes the most practical breakpoint at which to shift from
pricing to prohibiting.”).
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Step Two: Determine whether the perpetrator is subject to another
enforcer (public or private, civil or criminal). If not, then skip this step. If
so, however, revisit Step One, considering only the marginal benefits and
harms of prosecution. Only if the marginal benefits exceed the marginal
harms should the state prosecute.
Discussion of Step Two
This step incorporates the multi-enforcer aspect of the securities
regulation regime. In this step, prosecutors should first assess whether
another enforcer is pursuing, or is likely to pursue, this perpetrator.
Possibilities include criminal prosecution by the federal government or
another state; civil enforcement by the SEC, by this state’s securities
regulator, or by another state’s securities regulator; and a private civil
action under federal or state law by injured investors. Just because another
enforcement is theoretically possible does not mean that it will occur. On
the public side, regulators
210
and prosecutors
211
are selective in pursuing
enforcement. On the private side, even if investors have a theoretically
viable claim for damages, they may not pursue it because the costs of
litigation may exceed the expected recovery.
212
Although the class action
mechanism may enable some of these negative-value claims to proceed,
“smaller issuers are relatively immune to class actions, significantly
reducing any deterrence or compensation value of such mechanism.”
213
If no other enforcement is likely, prosecutors should skip this step of
the analysis. If at least one other enforcer is pursuing, or is likely to
pursue, this perpetrator, however, prosecutors should revisit Step One’s
benefits-harms analysis, this time considering only the marginal benefits
and harms of criminal prosecution in light of the goals of prosecuting
210. SeeDi Trolio, supra note 22, at 1306 (“Another reason for state enforcement is that
federal government enforcement is selective.”).
211. See id. at 1311 (“Moreover, the existence of prosecutorial discretion necessarily
means that overlapping jurisdiction does not necessarily result in duplicative
enforcement.”).
212. See Carlos Berdejó, Small Investments, Big Losses: The States’ Role in Protecting
Local Investors from Securities Fraud, 92 WASH. L. REV. 567, 579–80 (2017) (“But
investors who have a valid claim under the securities laws will not necessarily bring a
lawsuit to assert their rights. . . . Arguably, the costs and risks associated with bringing a
lawsuit are likely to present a more formidable barrier to investors who have suffered
relatively small losses.”); see also Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 124, at 1436 (“When
claims are less marketable, private parties and attorneys may lack resources or incentives to
pursue individual litigation.”).
213. SeeBerdejó, supra note 212, at 581.
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securities crime. As in Step One, prosecutors should continue to assume
that state law is coextensive with federal law.
Marginal Benefits
Deterrence & Compensation
Private securities litigation furthers both deterrence and compensation
goals.
214
However, for several reasons, criminal prosecution might
nonetheless have a marginal impact.
215
For one, substantive and procedural
restrictions on securities litigation, most of which are contained in the
PSLRA, allow some perpetrators to escape liability.
216
For example, the
discovery stay, which applies to federal securities claims pending in federal
court, stays discovery until resolution of the defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
217
In order to survive a motion to dismiss a securities fraud action,
plaintiffs must plead a strong inference of scienter.
218
This heightened
pleading standard is often unachievable without the benefit of discovery,
even if the perpetrator actually possessed scienter.
219
As another example,
the safe harbor for forward-looking statements, which applies to private
civil securities actions under federal law, insulates from liability certain
214. See Moohr, supra note 128, at 1478 (“Private civil suits not only provide
compensation to those injured, they also enlarge scrutiny of corporate conduct and deter
other firms from engaging in similar conduct.”); see Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, 31, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731
(“Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can
recover their losses without having to rely upon government action. Such private lawsuits
promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing
and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly
perform their jobs.”).
215. See Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 124, at 1435–36 (“We argue that prosecutors
should seek large-scale compensation only when there is strong evidence that neither a civil
class action nor individual private litigation will hold defendants accountable, efficiently
resolve multiple claims, or equitably distribute victim compensation.”); see also Coffee,
Reflections, supra note 105, at 238 (“First, tortious conduct can impose enormous
externalities upon society, and in some of the new areas where the criminal sanction is being
used—worker safety, toxic dumping, securities fraud—existing tort and regulatory remedies
are generally believed not to have produced adequate deterrence.”).
216. See Moohr, supra note 128, at 1478 (“Private plaintiffs no longer have ready access
to courts to obtain civil redress for securities fraud, and the scrutiny provided by private
attorneys general has been forsaken.”).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
219. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 530 (2009)
(“The intersection of these rules puts a plaintiff in a vise: the pleading rules require
particularized allegations and a strong inference of scienter, while the discovery stay
deprives the attorney of the conventional means to develop this information.”).
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forward-looking statements that are identified as such and accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language, regardless of the speaker’s mental state.
220
In addition, if the private litigation is proceeding as a class action,
there is a risk that class counsel might agree to an unduly low settlement,
undercutting the deterrent and compensatory effects of the private suit.
Class action litigation poses the risk of agency costs because “substantial
conflicts of interest between attorney and client can arise.”
221
As explained
by Professor Coffee, these conflicts arise because “plaintiff’s attorneys
have more at stake than their clients;”
222
“the attorney/entrepreneur has
more reason to desire an early settlement than the client;”
223
and “because
plaintiff’s fee awards are typically a declining percentage of the recovery,
the attorney benefits less from an increase in the recovery than does his or
her clients.”
224
Thus, “[t]he classic agency cost problem in class actions
involves the ‘sweetheart’ settlement, in which the plaintiff’s attorney trades
a high fee award for a low recovery.”
225
Although the PSLRA sought to
limit agency costs in securities class actions, such as by imposing a
rebuttable presumption that the investor with the largest financial interest
be appointed lead plaintiff
226
and by imposing a “reasonable percentage”
restriction on class counsel’s attorneys’ fees and expenses,
227
conflicts of
interest remain.
228
Of course, prosecutors are not immune from principal-
agent problems,
229
but they can potentially further deterrence and
220. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(a)(i).
221. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1987)
[hereinafter Coffee, Regulation].
222. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions:
Why “Exit” Works Better Than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 413 (2008) [hereinafter
Coffee, Accountability] (“When one adds these two amounts--the expenses that the attorney
must bear and the attorney’s expected contingent fee--the attorney has far more at stake than
any individual class member.”).
223. See id. (“[T]ime is money, and delay for class counsel means additional costs and
expenses that the attorney alone bears.”)
224. Id.
225. Coffee, Regulation, supra note 221, at 883.
226. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(6); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6).
228. See Coffee, Accountability, supra note 222, 417 (2008) (“When institutional
investors exit the class and sue individually, they appear to do dramatically better--by an
order of magnitude!”).
229. See Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 124, at 1416 (“At first blush, prosecutors seem
to present less of a principal-agent problem than private class counsel. Prosecutors have no
independent financial stake in the final settlement. . . . Principal-agent problems exist,
however, even when public officials are charged with representing victims’ interests.”).
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compensation goals under circumstances where securities class actions fall
short.
Further, even if the defendant were held liable in damages to injured
investors, criminal prosecution might nonetheless further deterrence. For
one, being convicted of a crime carries with it a stigma that is different in
degree and in kind than civil liability. Additionally, even if damages
liability would, in theory, serve as an adequate deterrent, it might fall short
in practice if the perpetrator and other potential perpetrators were
judgment-proof.
230
For example, if a $10 million judgment would, in
theory, serve as an adequate deterrent, it would lose its deterrent impact if
the perpetrator lacked the resources to pay the judgment.
Finally, a state criminal prosecution might actually affect the outcome
of concurrent private litigation, increasing the deterrence value of the
private litigation. In other words, the mere fact that the state is pursuing
criminal charges might increase the value of the civil suit.
231
Likewise, civil enforcement by a state or federal regulator and
criminal prosecution by another state or by the federal government can
further both deterrence and compensation goals.
232
For several reasons,
however, state criminal prosecution might have a marginal impact. First,
as discussed above, if the other enforcement is civil rather than criminal,
the heightened stigma associated with criminal prosecution may marginally
increase deterrence.
Second, the state criminal prosecution might be more effective than
the other public enforcement, whether civil or criminal. Because of
capture
233
or insufficient resources,
234
the other enforcer might be too
230. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 108, at 224 (“Where tort remedies
are an adequate deterrent because optimal tort damages, including any punitive damages, are
within the ability to pay of the potential defendant, there is no need to invoke criminal
penalties. . . .”).
231. SeeRose,Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2223 (citing James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas with the assistance of Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777 (2003)) (“Empirical studies show that Rule 10b-5 class
actions are likely to settle more quickly, and for more money, if the government has brought
a parallel action against the defendant.”).
232. See Kokesh v. S.E.C., 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643, 198 L. Ed. 2d 86 (2017) (“[I]t has
become clear that deterrence is not simply an incidental effect of [SEC] disgorgement.”);
Strader, supra note 127, at 102 (“There is substantial evidence that white collar defendants
are strongly deterred by civil/administrative sanctions, including debarment. The public
humiliation and loss of status that attend such sanctions create their own deterrent effect.”).
233. See Totten, supra note 164, at 1659 (explaining the incentives that “can make state
AGs an effective counterbalance to a captured federal regulator”); Minzner, supra note 164,
at 2119 (“If enforcement is centralized in a single federal agency, capture can produce
underenforcement and underdeterrence. Additional enforcers can counteract capture by
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lenient in charging decisions, especially with respect to charging
individuals,
235
or in negotiating a settlement or plea agreement.
236
In
addition, because of greater agility
237
or access to resources or
information,
238
the state prosecutor might be better situated to achieve a
conviction. Finally, to the extent that a second criminal prosecution would
increase media coverage, it could have a marginal impact on general
deterrence.
Retribution
Finally, state criminal prosecution might have a marginal impact on
retribution goals. If the other enforcement is civil—either public or
private—it is unlikely to express the weight of society’s disapproval to the
bringing their resources to bear and competing with the primary public enforcer.
Decentralization thus allows other entities to supplement the enforcement efforts of the
primary administrative agency.”); Jones, supra note 9, at 124
(“Maintaining multiple levels of regulation provides an antidote to regulatory capture.”).
234. See Berdejó, supra note 10, at 585 (“Due to limited resources, the SEC cannot
investigate all alleged securities violations brought to its attention.”); Jones, supra note 9, at
126-27 (“Because the SEC lacks adequate resources to effectively police the national
securities market, supplemental enforcement is essential to achieve an appropriate level of
deterrence.”).
235. See Jean Eaglesham & Anupreeta Das, Wall Street Crime: 7 Years, 156 Cases and
Few Convictions, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (May 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-
street-crime-7-years-156-cases-and-few-convictions-1464217378 (“The Wall Street Journal
examined 156 criminal and civil cases brought by the Justice Department, Securities and
Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission against 10 of the
largest Wall Street banks since 2009. In 81% of those cases, individual employees were
neither identified nor charged. A total of 47 bank employees were charged in relation to the
cases. One was a boardroom-level executive, the Journal’s analysis found.”).
236. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal As Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV.
1789, 1799 (2015) (“That problem grew worse over the past decade, however, since far
more of the truly important corporate prosecutions now do not result in a conviction, but
rather in alternatives to a conviction called deferred prosecution agreements (in which a case
is initially filed but stayed on a judge’s docket pending compliance with its terms), and non-
prosecution agreements (in which no criminal case is filed in court).”).
237. See Totten, supra note 164, at 1655–56 (“States will often have the ability to
respond to emerging harms more swiftly than their federal counterparts because of the
nature of their offices and the type of law they enforce. The first reason is straightforward:
AGs have less bureaucracy. In the vast majority of states, the AG is a separately elected,
constitutional officer and, therefore, does not report to any higher authority. Sprawling
federal regulators can have multiple layers of review that mean delay when states are
nimble.”).
238. See id. at 1653–54 (“The states often have distinct information advantages because
of their proximity to the harms and the type of laws they enforce, which facilitate more
responsive enforcement.”).
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same degree as a criminal prosecution.
239
In addition, because civil cases
are more likely to settle, courts are less likely to play “any expressive role
in highlighting unacceptable forms of misconduct.”
240
Even if the other
enforcement is criminal, a second criminal prosecution could nonetheless
have a marginal impact, especially if the other prosecutor is too lenient in
charging decisions or plea negotiations or if the other prosecution is less
likely to achieve a conviction.
Marginal Harms
The marginal harms of a state prosecution, including the marginal
costs of enforcement and imprisonment and the marginal over-deterrence
costs, should be weighed against the aforementioned marginal benefits.
Costs of Prosecution and Punishment
Because of the potential for coordination or cooperation among
enforcers, the marginal costs of a state prosecution might be lower than if
proceeding in a regime without multiple enforcers. For example, in a 2009
executive order, President Obama established the Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force, and in a 2018 executive order, President Trump
replaced that task force with the Task Force on Market Integrity and
Consumer Fraud.
241
Both task forces were established in order to
“strengthen the efforts of the Department of Justice, in conjunction with
Federal, State, tribal, territorial, and local agencies,” to investigate and
prosecute financial fraud.
242
President Obama’s order sought to enhance
“coordination” with states,
243
while President Trump’s order sought to
enhance “cooperation” with states.
244
Regardless, if federal regulators or
prosecutors were willing to share information with state prosecutors, it
239. But see Herschkopf, supra note 118, at 455 (“This Article argues that we should
regard liability for civil securities fraud as a pronouncement of moral blameworthiness.”).
240. Zaring, supra note 131, at 1471.
241. Executive Order 13844, Establishment of the Task Force on Market Integrity and
Consumer Fraud (July 11, 2018), Fed. Reg. vol. 83, no. 136, at 33115; Executive Order
13519, Establishment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov. 17, 2009), Fed.
Reg. vol. 74, no. 222, at 60123.
242. Executive Order 13844, Establishment of the Task Force on Market Integrity and
Consumer Fraud (July 11, 2018), Fed. Reg. vol. 83, no. 136, at 33115; Executive Order
13519, Establishment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov. 17, 2009), Fed.
Reg. vol. 74, no. 222, at 60123.
243. Executive Order 13519, Establishment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force (Nov. 17, 2009), Fed. Reg. vol. 74, no. 222, at 60124, § 3(c).
244. Executive Order 13844, Establishment of the Task Force on Market Integrity and
Consumer Fraud (July 11, 2018), Fed. Reg. vol. 83, no. 136, at 33116, § 4(c)(ii).
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could lessen the marginal costs of a state prosecution.
Second, because of the potential for concurrent sentencing, the
marginal costs of imprisonment might be lower than if the state prosecutor
were the only enforcer. In particular, if another state or the federal
government has primary jurisdiction over the defendant,
245
and if this
state’s sentence were to run concurrently with that sentence,
246
this state’s
incarceration costs could be decreased.
247
(Of note, the marginal deterrence
and retributive impacts of a concurrent sentence would likely be lower than
of a consecutive one, thus affecting the marginal benefits analysis above.)
Over-Deterrence Costs
Finally, if the conduct at issue implicates concerns about over-
deterrence,
248
the marginal over-deterrence costs of state prosecution must
be taken into account.
249
In particular, if the other enforcement is civil
rather than criminal, the over-deterrence costs of a state criminal
prosecution could be significant.
250
245. See Erin E. Goffette, Sovereignty in Sentencing: Concurrent and Consecutive
Sentencing of a Defendant Subject to Simultaneous State and Federal Jurisdiction, 37 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1035, 1055 (2003) (“The court that gains custody of a defendant first, as
determined by careful review of the facts of the arrest, enjoys ‘primary jurisdiction’ over the
defendant.”).
246. See id. at 1050 (“Most states grant the trial court the authority to decide whether
multiple sentences will be consecutive or concurrent.”).
247. See Henry J. Sadowski, Interaction of Federal and State Sentences When the
Federal Defendant is Under State Primary Jurisdiction, at 5 (July 7, 2011), https://www.bop
.gov/resources/pdfs/ifss.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG6M-Q2JK] (“The jurisdiction which is the
primary custodian is responsible for the cost of incarceration. When the federal authorities
are the primary custodian of the prisoner, the United States bears the costs of
incarceration.”).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 188–209 (discussing the complexities
surrounding the over-deterrence costs of criminal prosecution).
249. SeeMinzner, supra note 164, at 2118–19 (“Multiple enforcement actions by state or
federal regulators (or a private class action following a public enforcement action) will
produce multiple sanctions. Without careful coordination, these multiple sanctions might
well exceed the optimal level of punishment for a given violation. In this way,
decentralization can produce overpunishment and overdeterrence.”).
250. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 108, at 224 (“[A] savage penalty will
induce people to forgo socially desirable activities at the borderline of criminal activity.”);
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (1990) (“High criminal penalties will deter people
from desirable, but only marginally lawful, activity because they are uncertain whether they
will be convicted of a crime.”).
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Step Three: Determine whether the conduct is criminalized under
federal law. If so, then skip this step. If not, however, then determine
whether the conduct was intrastate or interstate and, based thereon,
incorporate any resultant additional benefits and harms of prosecution into
the above analysis under Step One or Step Two, whichever was most
recently applied.
Discussion of Step Three
This step incorporates the dual-regulatory aspect of the securities
regulation regime. In this step, prosecutors should first assess whether the
conduct is criminalized under federal law. If so, then prosecutors should
skip this step. If not, however, prosecutors should determine whether the
conduct at issue was intrastate or interstate, considering any additional
benefits and harms of prosecution accordingly.
In order for the conduct to qualify as intrastate, all affected parties
(including the issuer and the investors) must reside in this state and all of
the issuer’s relevant communications must have been limited to this state.
For example, an offering satisfying the Rule 147 intrastate offering
exemption—which requires that all offers and sales be made to residents of
the state in which the issuer is resident
251
—would likely qualify as
intrastate conduct. If, however, the issuer resides in another state, any
investor resides out of the state, or any relevant communication was
directed to residents of another state, then the conduct qualifies as
interstate.
Additional Benefits
Intrastate Conduct
If the conduct at issue was intrastate, then prosecution under state
securities law that is more expansive than federal law could provide the
additional benefit of serving as a so-called “laboratory of experimentation.”
As famously expressed by Justice Brandeis, “[i]t is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”
252
States have the
potential to “respond rapidly and in a variety of ways to perceived market
and regulatory needs.”
253
Accordingly, “[s]hould a state create a more
251. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147.
252. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
253. Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to
Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 232–33 (1987).
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effective system than that of another state, or of the federal government, the
latter jurisdictions can benefit by adapting their own systems to make them
more effective.”
254
Interstate Conduct
If the conduct at issue was interstate, however, then the experiment
would fail because the prosecution would affect regulated parties’ out-of-
state conduct,
255
thus rendering the results of any such state experiment
“impossible to discern.”
256
In other words, contrary to the vision expressed
by Justice Brandeis, the prosecution could pose a “risk to the rest of the
country.”
257
Additional Harms
Interstate Conduct
If the conduct at issue was interstate, there is an increased risk of
additional harm from so-called “Balkanization,” which refers to the
potential that states’ differing standards as applied to one regulated party
“will result in a confusing patchwork of conduct standards throughout the
nation.”
258
At the extreme, these standards could conflict, rendering it
impossible for a regulated party to comply with all applicable standards.
259
More likely in the context of securities crime, parties in a Balkanized
landscape would face increased costs of doing business.
260
In addition, if the conduct at issue was interstate, prosecution under
state securities law that is more expansive than federal law risks disrupting
national policy. Because “regulated parties will conform their behavior to
254. Di Trolio, supra note 22, at 1313.
255. SeeMichael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 326 (1998) (“As a practical matter, because
issuers cannot prevent the residents of particular states from buying their securities on
impersonal national exchanges, corporations will have no choice but to subject themselves
to the laws of all states. Under these conditions, there can be little or no competition in any
meaningful sense and states have little or no incentive to adopt efficient rules.”).
256. See Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2210; see also Perino, supra note 255,
at 324 (“Viewed from this perspective, it is apparent that a competitive market for state
fraud causes of action, at least as that market is currently structured, cannot exist for issuers
whose securities trade on national markets.”).
257. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
258. Jones, supra note 9, at 127.
259. See Mathiesen, supra note 61, at 313 (“The cacophony of many different and
possibly conflicting sets of rules would impose great compliance costs and inject uncertainty
into the securities market. The efficiency loss would be tremendous.”).
260. Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1353.
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meet the demands of the strictest regulator with authority over them,”
261
the
state securities law would become the de facto law of the land.
262
There is
the potential that, as a consequence, other national policies that were
crafted to dovetail with federal law could be disrupted.
263
Of course,
disruption of national policy is not harmful if the state is filling a federal
regulatory vacuum.
264
In that scenario, however, the prosecutor should be
explicit about the federal gap that is being filled and should recognize that
the decision to prosecute is likely to affect national policy.
Intrastate Conduct
If the conduct at issue was intrastate, however, there is a lessened risk
of additional harms from Balkanization or the disruption of national policy.
First, if the regulated conduct was intrastate, the regulated party would be
subject to, at most, two regulatory schemes, the federal scheme and the
state scheme, rather than a cacophony. Second, if the conduct at issue was
intrastate, then other parties engaged in interstate conduct or conduct
wholly within another state would not fear prosecution under this state’s
261. Rose,Multienforcer, supra note 129, at 2210.
262. SeeRose, State, supra note 14, at 1353 (“Policy distortion can result from mere lack
of coordination and communication between enforcers. But it can also result when different
enforcers have different views on what the appropriate policy should be. When this occurs,
the more aggressive enforcer’s viewpoint will always win out, creating a one-way ratchet as
regulated parties adjust their behavior to conform to the demands of the strictest enforcer
with jurisdiction over them.”).
263. See Mathiesen, supra note 61, at 328 (“Actual balkanization would see state
attorneys general attempting to restructure the securities market with ‘reforms’ that would in
reality prove deleterious to the integrity and efficiency of a national market system.”);
Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks at the F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium Washington
University School of Law, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 545, 550 (2003) (“Our mutual goal should be
to avoid re-balkanizing (to paraphrase Chairman Donaldson) the securities markets, and
effectively, undoing the work Congress has done. We, as public servants and policy makers,
should ask ourselves how the actions we contemplate taking as federal or state actors would
promote or detract from Congress’ vision of a truly national market system.”).
264. Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1367 (“For example, if captured federal agencies can
engage in rulemaking that undesirably restricts the scope of federal law, state enforcement
of state law can serve as a counterweight whereas state enforcement of federal law could
not.”); Di Trolio, supra note 22, at 1314 (“States do have an important role to play in the
enforcement of securities laws because of the limitations placed on the federal government
by the public choice theory. An alternative method of enforcement is needed for the
following scenarios: 1) instances in which federal regulation is too lax, and 2) instances in
which state action can highlight gaps in federal enforcement either because gaps exist in the
regulations themselves, or because the federal government is not aware of certain abuses of
the market.”).
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law, thus avoiding the potential for this prosecution to disrupt national
policy by becoming the de facto law of the land.
265
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have sought to make several contributions. First, I
have contextualized state prosecution of securities crime within a dual-
regulatory, multi-enforcer regime. Second, I have argued that the goals of
prosecuting securities crime are multi-faceted and sometimes in tension and
that they must be analyzed against the backdrop of this regime. Finally, I
have proposed principles of prosecutorial discretion to guide state
prosecutors when deciding whether to prosecute securities crime, in light of
the goals of prosecuting securities crime and the complex regime of
securities regulation in the United States.
265. See Rose, State, supra note 14, at 1366 (“It also presents greater potential costs in
terms of federal policy distortion, because it allows for greater state level deviation from
federal policy goals (assuming, importantly, that the relevant state laws are not restricted to
primarily intrastate activities).”).
